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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
under §78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, in that it is an appeal from 
a final Order entered in a civil proceeding. The proceeding 
below arose from a divorce action between the parties relating to 
enforcement and interpretation of the original Decree of Divorce 
entered August 14, 1980. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The April 21, 1987, Order entered by Third District 
Court Judge David S. Young modifying the original Decree of 
Divorce entered August 14, 1980, raises the following issues: 
1. The lower court committed reversible error by 
failing to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in sup-
port of the Order modifying the terms of the original Decree of 
Divorce. 
2. The lower court abused its discretion by modifying 
the Decree of Divorce regarding visitation for Defendant husband 
where there was no finding of "substantial change of 
circumstances." 
3. The lower court's awarding the Defendant attorney's 
fees was an abuse of discretion since no evidence was introduced 
on the issue of "reasonableness" of fees and no Findings of Fact 
were entered on the same issue. 
4. The Court's interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 of 
the original Decree of Divorce misapplied the law to the facts of 
this case and failed to use the best evidence before the Court on 
the issue. 
5. The lower court's failure to award the Plaintiff 
Carolyn Bettinger (Boies) Judgment for past due child support was 
an abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on 
August 14, 1980. The Decree of Divorce awarded the Plaintiff the 
care, custody and control of the four minor children of the par-
ties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation being reserved 
in the Defendant. The Defendant was ordered to pay child support 
in the amount of $200.00 per month per child for a total of 
$800.00 per month at the time of the entry of the Decree. The 
child support was further ordered to increase each year on August 
1st by an amount of eight percent (3%). 
The Decree of Divorce was amended following trial 
for two days before the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge presiding. 
A Minute Entry reflecting the decision of the Court to amend the 
Decree of Divorce was entered on February 1, 1985, and an Order 
was entered by the Court on September 25, 1985, pursuant to the 
Minute Entry of Judge Rokich. 
On July 23, 1985, the Defendant was ordered to appear 
before the Court and show cause why Judgment should not be 
entered against him for past due child support. The matter was 
heard before the Commissioner of the Court on December 31, 1985, 
and the Commissioner recommended that Judgment be entered in the 
amount of $2,705.50 for past due child support through October, 
1985, and that an Order to Withhold and Deliver be entered. On 
January 10, 1986, the Defendant filed an Objection to the 
Commissioner's Recommendation. 
On March 24, 1986, an Order was entered by the Court 
awarding Judgment to the Plaintiff in the amount of $2,705.50 for 
child support arrearages and directing that an Order to Withhold 
and Deliver be entered. On May 9, 1986, Defendant filed a Notice 
of Hearing on his Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation. 
Following the entry of the Judgment and Order to Withhold and 
Deliver, the Utah State Office of Recovery Services began collec-
tion procedures against the Defendant. On January 13, 1987, 
the Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order and Waiver of 
Notice, and on that same date an Order was entered by Judge 
Judith M. Billings staying the enforcement of the Judgment and 
any collection efforts by the Office of Recovery Services on the 
Judgment until further hearing. 
On March 11, 1987, an Order to Show Cause was filed 
by the Defendant and served upon the Plaintiff requesting relief 
as follows: 
A. Setting aside the Order and Judgment previously 
entered; 
B. That the collection procedures be set aside; 
C. Finding the Plaintiff in contempt of court for 
disobeying Orders of visitation; 
D. Seeking an injunction against Plaintiff from 
interfering with visitation; 
E. Seeking a finding determining the amount of 
Defendant's lien against the parties' real property; 
F. Ordering the home immediately sold and the pro-
ceeds of the sale awarded to the Defendant to the extent of his 
lien; 
G. Judgment in favor of the Defendant and against 
the Plaintiff for his equity in the home; 
H. Entering an Order interpreting the intent and 
meaning of the words of the Decree regarding Defendant's child 
support obligation; 
I. Seeking an Order that the Defendant made excess 
payments of child support; 
J. Seeking a reduction of Plaintiff's monthly obli-
gation for child support by reason of excess payments and 
directing Plaintiff to pay Defendant's equity in the real 
property; and 
K. Seeking attorney's fees and costs. 
Hearing on the Orders to Show Cause of each of the par-
ties , the Defendant's Motion to Stay the Judgment, and the 
Defendant's Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation was 
held before the Court on March 24, 1987, with further arguments 
of counsel being heard on April 9, 1987. Minute Entries were 
placed in the file for both hearings and an Order was submitted 
to the Court by counsel for the Defendant, a copy of which was 
mailed to counsel for the Plaintiff on April 9, 1987. The 
Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Order, Request for 
Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial on April 20, 1987. The 
Court entered the Order over Plaintiff's objections on April 21, 
1987. The Order signed by the Court on April 21, 1987, contained 
no Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, but amended the Decree 
of Divorce as follows: 
A. Changing the Order of specific visitation which 
had been entered by the Court on September 25, 1985; 
B. Striking paragraph 8 of the Decree of Divorce 
which directed the Defendant to pay the mortgage payments on the 
family home; 
C. Modifying the provisions for the payment of 
child support to allow the Defendant to protect his interest in a 
marital asset (real property) by allowing a setoff against the 
payment of child support for any mortgage payments which 
Defendant continued to make on the parties' former marital 
residence; 
D. Setting aside the Judgment entered on March 24, 
1986, in the principal amount of $2,705.50; 
E. Granting the Defendant control of the former 
family home and giving him full authority to undertake any and 
all actions necessary to accomplish the sale of the home; 
F. Awarding Judgment in favor of the Defendant and 
against the Plaintiff for attorney's fees. 
On May 18, 1987, Plaintiff filed a Motion pursuant to 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with supporting 
Affidavit requesting that Judge David S. Young recuse himself 
from this matter. All proceedings were stayed in this matter 
pursuant to Rule 63(b) until June 22, 1987, when a decision was 
made by Minute Entry by the presiding judge, Scott Daniels. 
At a time convenient to counsel and the Court, 
hearing was held before the Court on August 31, 1987, on 
Plaintifffs Objection to the Order and Request for a New Trial. 
Following hearing, the Order of the Court was entered on 
September 21, 1987, which summarily denied the relief prayed for 
by the Plaintiff. 
On November 10, 1987, the Plaintiff filed a Notice 
of Appeal from the Orders entered on April 21, 1987, and 
September 11, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A Decree of Divorce (attached as Exhibit 1) was entered 
in this matter pursuant to Stipulation of the parties on August 
14, 1980, providing in pertinent part, as follows: 
A. At paragraph 2, it was ordered that "Defendant shall 
have reasonable visitation with each of the children upon reason-
able notice." 
B. Paragraph 3 ordered the Defendant to pay child sup-
port in the amount of $200.00 per month per child; 
C. The Defendant was ordered to increase the amount of 
child support payments each year on August 1st by an amount of 
eight percent (8%). 
D. Paragraph 7 provided: 
"Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the 
marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 
4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to a lien 
thereon for one-half of the equity that may be in 
the house at the time of the liquidation (which 
contemplates an increasing equity as the value 
increases). The equity is defined as the fair 
market value or sales price at the time Defendant 
becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set forth 
herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of 
improvements made by Plaintiff and costs of sale. 
This Lien shall not be forecloseable until the 
youngest child reaches 18 or until the home is sold 
or until Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence of 
any of these events, two-thirds of the house 
payment then made shall be converted to child sup-
port and that sum shall be paid to the Plaintiff 
on a monthly basis as additional child support. 
E. Paragraph 8 of the Decree of Divorce provided: 
8. Defendant is ordered to continue making 
the payments on the home. Defendant shall also be 
entitled to take the entire interest portion of the 
house payment as a deduction for himself as well as 
three income tax exemptions on the children with 
Plaintiff to receive one exemption on the youngest 
child at the present time. (Record, pages 21-24.) 
The Defendant filed a Petition for Home Study and 
Modification of Custody in 1983 which was tried before the 
Honorable John A. Rokich on January 29th and 30th, 1985. In the 
interim, the Plaintiff remarried in September, 1984. The Court 
took the matter under advisement and made its ruling by Minute 
Entry on February 1, 1985. (Record, pp. 99-102.) A Decree was 
entered on September 25, 1985 (Attached as Exhibit 2), reflecting 
the Minute Entry of Judge Rokich as follows: 
1. Awarding each of the parties custody of two 
of their minor children. 
2. Directing the Defendant to pay an additional 
$25.00 per month in support of the minor child, 
Chris Bettinger. 
3. Providing specific rights of visitation with 
the minor children by the custodial (sic) parent on 
alternate weekends commencing at 6:00 p.m. Friday 
and ending 6:00 p.m. Sunday beginning February 8, 
1985, and on weeks not preceded by weekend visita-
tion, non-custodial parent was entitled to one 
weekend visit from 5:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. on a 
night satisfactory to both parties. Each of the 
parties were restrained from disparaging remarks 
and from interfering with disciplinary measures 
imposed by the custodial parent as well as from 
interfering with telephone communication of the 
children. 
4. Each party was to notify the other of any 
juvenile delinquency charges filed against any 
children in their care to allow the non-custodial 
parent to attend any juvenile court hearing which 
might occur. (Record, pp. 118 and 119.) 
On July 15, 1985, preceding the entry of the Order of 
Judge Rokich, the Plaintiff filed an Affidavit in support of an 
Order to Show Cause seeking Judgment for past-due child support 
and other relief. (Record, pp. 105-108.) An Order to Show Cause 
was issued by the Court on September 6, 1985, directing the 
Defendant to appear and show cause why the relief prayed for by 
the Plaintiff should not be granted. (Record, p. 113.) The 
Order to Show Cause issued upon Plaintiff's Motion was argued 
before the Court on October 7, 1985, and taken under advisement. 
(Record, p. 120.) In October, 1985, the Plaintiff submitted a 
supplemental Affidavit addressing the amounts in dispute and 
showing the Defendant to be in arrears for child support in the 
amount of $2,705.50. The Affidavit was filed on June 3, 1986. 
(Record, pp. 131-145.) The Defendant also filed an Affidavit on 
September 20, 1985, disputing the amount of child support due. 
This Affidavit was also filed on January 3, 1986. (Record, pp. 
168-198.) The Recommendation of the Commissioner was entered on 
December 31, 1985, and copies of the Commissioner's 
Recommendation were mailed to counsel on January 3, 1986. 
(Record, pp. 127 and 128.) The Defendant filed an Objection to 
the Commissioner's Recommendation on January 10, 1986, a copy of 
which was mailed to Con Kostopulos, counsel for the Defendant on 
January 10, 1986. (Record, p. 208.) Mr. Kostopulos was 
suspended from the practice of law in January, 1986, and 
Plaintiff obtained new counsel. 
The objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation which 
was filed with the Court on January 10, 1986, and mailed to 
counsel for the Plaintiff, Con Kostopulos, 712 Judge Building, 8 
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, was never received by coun-
sel for the Plaintiff. An envelope was contained in the court's 
files showing a mailing from the Salt Lake County Clerk's office 
to Mr. Con Kostopulos at that address on January 3, 1986, which 
was returned "attempted, now known." Plaintiff or her new coun-
sel did not receive a copy of the Commissioner's Recommendation. 
An Order was prepared pursuant to the Recommendations of 
the Commissioner which was entered by the Court on March 24, 
1986. The Order which was entered on March 24, 1986, was pre-
pared by new counsel for the Plaintiff without knov/ledge that the 
Objection existed. The Order awarded Plaintiff Judgment in the 
amount of $2,705.50, directed that an Order to Withhold and 
Deliver be entered, restrained each of the parties from 
harrassing, abusing or annoying the other, directed that future 
support payments would be made through the clerk of the Court, 
admonished each of the parties to comply with the visitation 
requirement set forth by the Order of Judge Rokich and denied 
Plaintiff's Motion for an award of personal property. A copy of 
that Order was mailed to Robert N. Macri, counsel for the 
Defendant, on March 14, 1986. (Record, pp. 212-214.) 
Counsel for Defendant filed a Notice of Hearing on 
Defendant's Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation on 
May 9, 1986, said hearing to be held before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich on August 5, 1986. (Record, p. 215.) By order of the 
Court on August 8, 1986, the hearing was continued to September 
15, 1986, and continued again without date on September 12, 1986. 
(Record, pp. 216, 217 and 220.) 
Pursuant to the Order entered by the Court on March 24, 
1986, the Utah State Office of Recovery Services, in September, 
1986, commenced collection efforts for past due child support by 
garnishment of the Defendant's pay check from his employment. It 
was not until January 13, 1987, that the Defendant filed a Motion 
to set aside the Order of March 24, 1986, based upon mistake. 
The Court entered an Order on that date directing that enfor-
cement of the Judgment and all collections would be stayed until 
hearing could be held on Defendant's Motion to set aside the 
Order. Hearing was set for February 9, 1987. (Record, pp. 
223-236.) On March 2, 1987, the Defendant filed an Affidavit 
(Attached as Exhibit 3) with the Court stating: 
1. That he had been awarded custody of two of the 
children of the parties in January, 1985; 
2. That he had been denied visitation rights with the 
two minor children who remained in the custody of the Plaintiff; 
3. That the Plaintiff had remarried in August, 1984; 
4. That the Utah State Department of Social Services, 
Office of Recovery Services, had attempted to garnish his wages 
based upon the Judgment entered on March 24, 1986; 
5. That he was entitled to a decrease in child support 
as a result of the Plaintiff's remarriage and that he had con-
tinued to make the monthly mortgage payment on the home of the 
parties for the sole purpose of protecting his equity in the 
home; 
6. That the mortgage payment in August, 1984, was 
$275.00 and attaching to the Affidavit a schedule of the 
Defendant's computation of accruing child support since the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce as well as a summciry of all payments 
made to the Plaintiff since the entry of the Decree through 
October, 1986. (Record, pp. 244-302.) 
Based upon the Affidavit of the Defendant and without 
Motion, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing the 
Plaintiff to appear before the Court on March 24, 1987, to show 
cause why: 
1. The Order and Judgment of March 24, 1986, should not 
be vacated; 
2. Why execution, garnishment or other collection pro-
cedures pursuant to the Judgment should not be vacated and set 
aside; 
3. Why Plaintiff should not be held in contempt of 
court for disobeying Orders regarding Defendant's right of 
visitation; 
4. Why a permanent injunction should not be entered 
against the Plaintiff from further interfering with Defendant's 
rights of visitation; 
5. Why a finding should not enter establishing the 
amount of Defendant's lien in the real property; 
6. Why the real property should not be sold and the 
proceeds awarded to the Defendant to the extent of his lien; 
7. Why Judgment should not be entered for Defendant's 
lien; 
8. Why Findings and Orders should not be entered to 
resolve the meaning of the words of the Decree as to the extent 
of Defendants obligation for child support; 
9. Why findings and Orders should not be entered con-
firming the amount of payments made by the Defendant with 
Judgment in favor of the Defendant for excess payment above his 
obligation for child support; 
10. For an order terminating or reducing Plaintiff's 
(sic) monthly support obligation to reflect the excess payments 
made by Defendant; 
11. Seeking attorney's fees for the proceedings before 
the Court and for staying enforcement by the Utah State Office of 
Recovery Services. (Record, pp. 303-307.) 
A copy of the Defendant's Affidavit was never served upon the 
Plaintiff or Plaintiff's counsel. The Order to Show Cause was 
served upon the Plaintiff on March 7, 1987. (Record, pp. 247, 
248, and 307.) 
Hearing on the Order to Show Cause of the Plaintiff 
which was issued by the Court on September 6, 1985, Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Order filed on January 13, 1987, and 
Defendant's Order to Show Cause issued on March 11, 1987, was 
held before the Court on March 24, 1987. There was no Petition 
for Modification of the Decree of Divorce filed by either of the 
parties; however, Defendant submitted a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support of the Order to Show Cause (Attached as 
Exhibit 4). 
Pursuant to agreement between counsel and the Court, a 
proffer of evidence was made to the Court. (Transcript of 
Proceedings, Order to Show Cause, Evidentiary Hearing, March 24, 
1987, p. 3, Attached as Exhibit 6.) Counsel for the Defendant 
proffered that there were four issues to be decided by the Court. 
(Transcript, p. 3, lines 23-25.) Those issues were identified as 
follows: 
1. Visitation (Transcript, p. 3, line 25); 
2. The amount of the child support obligation and 
arrearage (Transcript, p. 4, line 24 through p. 5, line 1); 
3. What to do with the home (Transcript, p. 8, lines 
2-4); and 
4. Attorney's fees and costs (Transcript, p. 10, lines 
3-5). 
Counsel for the Defendant relied upon the Defendant's 
Affidavit of March 2, 1987, and the Court file to address the 
issues of visitation. Proffer was made that if the Defendant 
were to take the stand, he would testify that there have been 
significant problems with visitation. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 
1-23.) 
In addressing the issue of child support, counsel for 
the Defendant relied upon the language of the Decree asserting 
that it "is somewhat ambiguous" and arguing that upon the 
Plaintiff's remarriage, it was not intended that the support 
obligation would increase, but decrease because Defendant would 
be relieved of the house (mortgage) payment, (Transcript, p. 5, 
line 1 through p. 6, line 14.) Defendant then asserted that he 
would rely upon the Affidavit of March 2, 1987, to support the 
calculation of child support payment of arrearage. (Transcript, 
p. 6, line 18 through p. 7, line 24.) 
On the issue relating to the home, counsel for the 
Defendant proffered that the home has been listed for almost 
three years and has not been sold, that Defendant's appraiser had 
difficulty obtaining access to the home, and asked the court to 
allow the Defendant to attempt to sell the home. (Transcript, p. 
8, line 4 through p. 9, line 12.) 
On the issue of attorney's fees, counsel for the 
Defendant proffered that this has been an expensive proposition 
for the Defendant and submitted an exhibit which was received 
showing a statement for services rendered by counsel for the 
Defendant. Counsel further proffered that fees had been incurred 
for (1) attempting to stop collection by the Office of Recovery 
Services, (2) obtaining an Order to stay collection, (3) 
obtaining appropriate visitation, (4) determination of 
Defendant's child support obligation, and (5) the sale of the 
home. No evidence was presented regarding the reasonableness of 
the fees charged either for the services rendered or the hourly 
rate charged by counsel for the Defendant. (Transcript, p. 10, 
lines 3 through p. 12, line 12.) 
Exhibits D-l through D-8 were received by the Court 
showing Defendant's calculation of accruing child support 
payments, payments made to the Plaintiff, the Defendant's 
Affidavit of March 15, 1987 (Attached as Exhibit 5), the collec-
tion notice of the Office of Recovery Services, the statement of 
attorney's fees, and Defendant's appraisal which had been con-
ducted on the home. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff proffered that with regard to 
the issue of visitation, that the Defendant has continually 
involved the minor children of the parties in the dispute between 
the parties, that the Defendant was obtaining Affidavits from the 
children which had been filed in this matter to involve them in 
the dispute and that the children were actually subpoenaed to the 
Court. Counsel stated that the Plaintiff has encouraged visita-
tion and that the Defendant has previously told the children that 
if they did not want to visit, they did not have to. 
(Transcript, p. 18, line 6 through p. 19, line 13.) 
On the issue of computation of the child support obliga-
tion, the Plaintiff was granted leave to submit a supplemental 
Memorandum and Affidavit and deferred all proffer on that issue 
to the Memorandum and Affidavit to be submitted, all of which was 
allowed by the Court. (Transcript, p. 19, line 14 through line 
21.) 
On the issue of the control and sale of the home, coun-
sel for the Plaintiff proffered that the Plaintiff had remarried 
in September, 1984, that the home had been continuously listed 
for sale since 1984, that the Plaintiff and her new husband con-
tinued to occupy the home to attempt to sell it for approximately 
one year after their marriage, when they ceased to occupy the 
home, that the roof on the home collapsed in 1986 and was 
repaired completely at the Plaintiff's expense, that the home had 
a housesitter in it for some time to protect it against vandalism 
and make it more sellable, that the Defendant could not possibly 
accommodate listing the home and selling it as his job requires 
him to be out of town 75 percent of the time, that the Defendant 
had never inquired of the Plaintiff personally regarding the 
status of the home or who was occupying it, that the Plaintiff 
offered to cash the Defendant's interests out or selling the home 
on a lease option and that the problem with the sale of the home 
was the existing market conditions in the Salt Lake valley. 
(Transcript, p. 15, line 9 through p. 18, line 5.) 
On the issue of attorney's fees, counsel for the 
Plaintiff proffered that the Plaintiff had followed the law and 
had made only good faith efforts to obtain the payment of child 
support. It was asserted to the Court that each of the parties 
should pay their own costs and attorney's fees which they may 
incur in this matter. (Transcript, p. 19, line 22, through p. 
21, line 23.) 
Each of the parties were then sworn and testified 
regarding the issues of visitation. The Plaintiff testified that 
she had repeatedly supported the Defendant"s right of visitation, 
but that the parties had consistently had problems with visita-
tion throughout the seven years since the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. She further testified that the Defendant was not 
genuinely interested in visitation, and seldom made any reason-
able arrangements for visitation. If the Defendant would make 
arrangements for visitation, he would often fail to arrive to 
pick up the children for the arranged visitation. (Transcript, 
p. 22, line 13, through p. 24, line 11.) 
The Defendant was sworn and testified regarding the 
issues of visitation. He disclosed that he had significant 
problems with his daughter, that he had not visited with her con-
sistently and that he believed the problem arose from the actions 
of the Plaintiff. (Transcript, p. 24, line 23, through p. 25, 
line 24.) The Defendant, under oath, requested specific visita-
tion. (Transcript, p. 26, lines 1-7.) 
The Court set out its Order of specific visitation at 
the hearing on March 24, 1987, as follows: 
I will enter a specific order of visitation. It is 
common that this court enters orders of visitation 
every other weekend and alternate red-letter holi-
days and half of Christmas and six weeks in the 
summer. I am willing to put all of that in an Order 
if your counsel cannot otherwise agree. That will 
be a specific order of this court. (Transcript, 
p. 27, lines 1-6.) 
There was no further discussion of specific visitation 
by the Court, the parties, or counsel at that hearing. The court 
then entered its ruling by Minute Entry pending further hearing 
and receipt of responsive Affidavit and Memoranda from the 
Plaintiff as follows: 
1. Visitation is to be liberal and reasonable. 
2. The child support issues were reserved with counsel 
for the Plaintiff's to submit an Affidavit within ten days. 
3. The issue of attorney's fees and costs were 
reserved. 
4. Access and management of the home was transferred to 
the Defendant. 
5. The orthodontist bill was to be examined by the par-
ties in the matter and be resolved. 
6. Further collection by the Office of Recovery 
Services was stayed. (Record, p. 310.) 
On April 3, 1987, the Plaintiff submitted her Affidavit 
in opposition to the Affidavit submitted by the Defendant on 
March 2, 1987. In pertinent part, the Affidavit provided as 
follows: 
a. Initially, I sought from Cass Bettinger, the 
custody of our four children...and child support in 
the sum of $300.00 per month per child, for a total 
obligation of $1,200.00 per month. I asked for 
possession of the home, and in exchange, I agreed 
that I would pay the mortgage on the property and 
that the house would be subject to a lien in favor 
of Cass Bettinger for one-half of the amount of our 
equity as it existed in 1980, at the time of the 
divorce. 
b. Defendant... rejected this offer of 
settlement...and stated as his reasons for 
rejecting the offer...his perception of the 
increasing value of the home....Cass Bettinger 
repeatedly expressed to me at the time of the 
divorce his belief that property would again double 
in value during the 1980fs and that he wanted to 
participate in that increase in equity on an 
investment basis. For that reason, he stated that 
he wanted to arrive at a settlement whereby he 
would retain the house as an investment and con-
tinue to pay the mortgage on the property and 
whereby I would allow him to receive any increase 
in equity which might occur during the decade of 
the 1980fs, rather than taking one-half of the 
equity as it existed at the time of the Decree in 
1980. He also agreed to pay one-half the cost of 
improvements to maintain his investment. To date, 
he has paid nothing. 
c. To resolve my claim for child support and 
possession of the house and Cass Bettinger1s com-
peting claim for continuing interest in any equity 
appreciation in the home, we arrived at the settle-
ment contained in paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree 
separating the home and mortgage entirely from 
child support. First, paragraph 7,...contains our 
agreement that Defendant's equity in the home 
would be calculated as of the date of the sale of 
the home rather than as of 1980, which con-
templated an increasing value of the equity. I was 
awarded the home and the lien to Cass Bettinger 
for one-half the "increasing" equity [which] would 
be payable to him upon our youngest child reaching 
the age of 18 years, upon my election to sell the 
home or upon my remarriage. Upon the first to 
occur of these contingencies, I was to receive, in 
addition to the child support ordered in paragraph 
3 of the Decree, an additional amount of two-thirds 
of the house payment on the home as additional 
child support to offset my costs in providing 
another residence for the children. Pursuant to 
paragraph 8 of the Decree, Defendant was to pay the 
mortgage payments on the home, not as child sup-
port, but as a real estate investment for as long 
as we retained the property. It was contemplated 
by myself and by Defendant, and we discussed at the 
time that we reached the stipulation in this case, 
that this would actually create a slight reduction 
in the Defendant's obligation to pay support to me 
in the event of my remarriage. We discussed the 
fact that this would occur because we assumed that 
the house would sell quickly upon being placed on 
the market and that because of the sale of the 
home, Defendant would be relieved from the obliga-
tion in the Decree to pay the mortgage. We agreed 
on the fact that his payment of the mortgage on our 
home until the date the home sold would not be 
support for the children, and that it would be in 
addition to the $200.00 per month, per child, child 
support ordered by the Court.... (Record, pp. 
311-314.) (Emphasis added.) 
No other evidence was presented to the Court by either party 
regarding the interpretation of paragraphs 3, 7 and 8 of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
Following the receipt of Plaintiff's Affidavit, the 
Court scheduled closing arguments for April 9, 1987. At the 
hearing on April 9, 1987, the Court first addressed the issue of 
visitation in an interchange with counsel for the Plaintiff. 
The following exchange took place: 
Ms. Corporon: There was a question of visitation 
which I believe the Court already ruled on from the 
bench previously and I don't think there is any 
need to address that today. 
Judge Young: Okay. In order that we're clear, 
so that you can make findings, just recite what 
your understanding of that is as to the Court's 
ruling at that time. 
Ms. Corporon: Is that he is going to have visi-
tation every other weekend and alternate state and 
federal holidays is my understanding. (Transcript 
of Proceedings, April 9, 1987, p. 4, lines 1-9.) 
The Court, in summing up the argument of counsel for 
the Plaintiff addressed the issue of specific visitation as 
follows: 
So, as you understand it then, the three issues 
to be determined are, first, visitation, which the 
Court indicated that it would follow if they needed 
a specific Order of the standard descriptive visi-
tation commonly used in the district. (Transcript, 
April 9, 1987, p. 5, line 25, through p. 6, line 
4.) 
Counsel for the Defendant addressed the issue of 
visitation in argument and stated his understanding of the 
Court's Order as follows: 
Mr. McDonald: Thank you, your Honor, I think 
the Court's correct on the matters that have been 
resolved. It was my understanding, however, the 
visitation Order was basically every other weekend, 
alternating red-letter holidays, six weeks in the 
summer and I had understood a weekday evening 
during the week that there wasn't a weekend 
visitation—a very brief one, maybe on Wednesdays. 
That was my recollection. (Transcript, April 9, 
1987, p. 6, line 22, through p. 7, line 4.) 
The Court recognized that the Defendant's request for specific 
visitation was unrealistic and unreasonable when it stated: 
In terms of every other weekend, it is clearly 
not possible for him to anticipate an opportunity 
to utilize that amount of visitation nor is it con-
sistent to think he is going to be here on the odd 
week to have a Wednesday or some other kind of 
visitation. So what's really going to happen here 
is, if these people are immature as they have 
shown, they are going to create confusion in the 
mind of a ten-year-old child that, I think, will 
create a tragedy." (Transcript, p. 15, lines 
7-15.) 
The transcripts then contain lengthy discussion of 
the Court's concerns regarding visitation, but there was no 
further discussion of the Order of visitation until the Court 
entered its only statement regarding the Order of visitation as 
follows: "Now, on visitation, I will grant the specific Order." 
(Transcript, April 9, 1987, p. 21, line 3.) 
In addition, the Court ordered that, "There be no 
interference with any telephone opportunity to talk with the 
child," (Transcript, April 9, 1987, p. 21, lines 4-6) and that 
advance notice is to be given on Thursday night preceding the 
visitation if Defendant would not exercise visitation. 
(Transcript, April 9, 1987, p. 17 lines 21, 21.) 
Paragraph 1 of the Order signed by the Court on 
April 21, 1987, provides for substantially different visitation 
than that which was ordered by the Court at the hearings of 
March 24, 1987 and April 9, 1987. 
Regarding child support arrearages and calculations, the 
Court determined that there were no arrearages, that the 
Plaintiff was not entitled to credit and that the Defendant was 
current in his child support payments. (Transcript, April 9, 
1987, p. 20, lines 18-22.) This ruling was made even though the 
Defendant admitted that he had made child support payments 
directly to the Plaintiff only in the amount of $10,065.20 from 
February 1, 1985, through February 1, 1987. (Record, p. 372.) 
Based upon Plaintiff's interpretation of the Decree of Divorce, 
the only evidence of interpretation which was presented to the 
Court, the Defendant was delinquent in the payment of child sup-
port in the amount of $12,832.55 for the period from February 1, 
1985, through February 1, 1987, based upon the entry of the Order 
on September 23, 1985. (See Exhibit "A", attached hereto.) In 
the alternative, if the change of support Order became effective 
as of the date of the Minute Entry of Judge Rokich, February 1, 
1985, the Defendant was delinquent in the payment of child sup-
port in the amount of $7/877.83 for the period from February 1, 
1985, through February 1# 1987. (See Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto.) These figures are arrived at by using the Defendant's 
calculations from his Affidavit. (Record, p. 370.) 
During the time which had elapsed between the hearings 
on March 24, and April 9, 1987, the Plaintiff received an offer 
on the home which was accepted making the issue of the transfer 
or control of the home moot. 
The Court then ruled that the Defendant was entitled to 
attorney's fees, as follows: 
...I do believe that she improperly contacted 
Recovery Services and that she created that problem 
improperly, and that as a result of that, I am 
going to order that she pay $500.00 toward his 
attorney's fees. That's the only thing I am going 
to do in that area to resolve that issue. 
(Transcript, p. 20, line 23 through p. 21, line 2.) 
Counsel for the Defendant prepared and submitted the 
Order on April 9, 1987, and on April 20, 1987, counsel for the 
Plaintiff filed a timely objection to the Order and a Motion for 
New Trial. (Record, pp. 383, 384.) The Court, on April 21, 
1987, without hearing on Plaintiff's Objection, signed and 
entered the Order which had been prepared by counsel for the 
Defendant. Hearing was held on Plaintiff's Objection to the 
Order and Motion for New Trial on August 28, 1987, and the Court 
summarily denied the relief prayed for by the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff then timely filed her Notice of Appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court's April 21# 1987, Order modifies the ori-
ginal Decree of Divorce in this matter regarding visitation 
without a Petition for Modification ever having been filed, and 
adds an interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original 
Decree of Divorce; the Court's failure to enter a finding of 
substantial change of circumstances, and generally failing to 
enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on each of the 
material issues is reversible error. 
2. The April 21, 1987, Order regarding visitation is 
significantly different than the Court's ruling from the bench 
stated March 24, 1987, during the hearing; since no further evi-
dence was introduced on a reasonable visitation schedule, the 
Court's April 21, 1987, Order should be vacated and a new Order 
reflecting the Court's original order should be entered. 
3. The Court's April 21, 1987, Order awarded Defendant 
Cass Bettinger $500.00 in attorney's fees. The award of attor-
ney's fees is reversible error since no evidence on the issue of 
reasonableness of attorney's fees was submitted and no Findings 
of Fact or Conclusions of Law reflecting reasonableness were 
entered by the Court. 
4. The Court failed to apply principles of law 
regarding legal construction of the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce when it interpreted paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original 
Decree of Divorce. The Court failed to consider the only evi-
dence submitted on the issue of interpretation and instead relied 
on counsel's argument in memorandum of law for a basis of the 
ruling. The Court's failure to apply law to the facts and evi-
dence of the case is an abuse of discretion. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the record of this case is somewhat confusing 
because of the myriad of hearings, Affidavits, Memoranda, record 
evidence and an unclear Decree of Divorce, the basis of this 
appeal is rooted in simple, legal principles which have been 
ignored by the trial court. The issues on appeal center on the 
Court's April 21, 1987, Order modifying and interpreting the ori-
ginal Decree of Divorce. The evidence upon which the Order was 
entered is: Decree of Divorce, entered August 14, 1980 (Record, 
pp. 21-24.)r Defendant Cass Bettinger's March 2, 1987, Affidavit 
(Record, pp. 244-245, Attachments, pp. 248-302); Defendant 
Bettinger March 16, 1987, Affidavit (Record, pp. 343-347, 
Attachments, pp. 348-360); Transcript of Hearing, March 24, 1987; 
Affidavit of Plaintiff Carolyn Bettinger, April 3, 1987 (Record, 
pp. 311-325); Order, April 21, 1987 (Record, pp. 387-391.) The 
balance of the record regarding the issues raised on appeal is 
legal arguments and proffers. 
The only issue which is somewhat complex relates to the 
unclear drafting of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original Decree of 
Divorce which was entered on the record by oral stipulation of 
counsel and reduced to writing August 14, 1980. (Record, pp. 
175-177.) However, even the issue of interpretation of 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree of Divorce should be settled on 
simple legal principles of document interpretation. 
The trial court's failure to observe basic legal prin-
ciples and follow standard judicial guidelines warrants reversal 
of the Court's April 21, 1987, Order and entry by this Court of 
appropriate Orders or, in the alternative, directions for 
appropriate action. 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND 
FAILING TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UPON MODIFICATION OF THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND BY FAILING TO FIND A 
"SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES" 
A. Legal Standards. 
A trial court should enter an Order modifying a 
Decree of Divorce only upon the filing of a Petition to Modify 
and not upon an Order to Show Cause proceeding, Rules of Practice 
in Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, Rule 9. 
Then, upon filing of a proper Petition, there must be a showing 
of "substantial change in circumstances" between the parties. 
Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1983); 
Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1980). 
Further, failure of a trial court to make Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on all material issues is rever-
sible error unless facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). The 
Findings of Fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 
follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). 
B. Modification of Divorce Decree. 
Paragraph 1 of the Court's April 21, 1987, Order 
changes visitation rights of Defendant Cass Bettinger under 
the Decree of September 23, 1986, to a newly detailed visitation 
schedule. (Record, pp. 385-386.) Additionally, the court 
interprets paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original Decree of Divorce 
such that Defendant's child support obligation is altered from 
the original intentions of the parties. 
No evidence was presented at the March 24, 1987, 
hearing as to the reasonableness of the existing visitation sche-
dule and no Findings of Fact were entered by the Court as to how 
it arrived at the appropriateness of the new schedule. The only 
mention by the court of its ruling is at page 27, lines 1-6, of 
the March 24, 1987, transcript, wherein Judge Young states: 
I will enter a specific Order of visitation. It is 
common that this court enter orders of visitation 
every other weekend and alternate red-letter holi-
days and half of Christmas and six weeks in the 
summer. I am willing to put all of that in an 
order if your counsel cannot otherwise agree. That 
will be a specific order of this court. 
C. Judge Young's Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce 
Regarding Visitation Rights Must be Reversed. 
The Defendant's failure to file a Petition for 
Modification and the Court's failure to enter Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on the issues of visitation and a visita-
tion schedule, and specifically failing to enter a finding of 
changed circumstances, warrants this Court's reversing the 
April 21, 1987, Order. Judge Young's understanding of what is 
common in the Third District Court simply may not be appropriate 
for these parties. Without specific Findings of Fact on the 
issue of visitation, one can only guess as to whether the best 
interests of the parties and their children are being served by 
entry of the Orders. Without these findings, which are par-
ticularly appropriate for guidelines to the parties and their 
counsel in this bitterly-contested matter, the Judge's Order 
modifying visitation cannot be upheld. This conclusion is 
further buttressed by a lack of a finding that, since entry of 
the Decree on September 23, 1986, there has been a material 
change in circumstances warranting visitation rights. 
II. 
THE COURT'S ORDER ENTERED APRIL 21, 1987, 
REGARDING VISITATION SHOULD BE VACATED 
AND A NEW ORDER REFLECTING THE COURT'S 
ACTUAL RULING ENTERED 
Paragraph 1 of the Court's April 21, 1987, Order, 
setting forth a detailed visitation schedule, is significantly 
different than the Court's original Order entered in open court 
on March 24, 1987. The Court's Order, as announced by Judge 
Young from the Bench, is set forth in Section I.B. herein. 
The April 21, 1987, Order differs from the Court's 
original Order in the following particulars: 
1. Paragraph 1(b) provides for visitation on one week-
day for three hours during those weeks when there is no visita-
tion; 
2. Paragraph 1(d) provides for visitation every 
Father's Day for six hours; 
3. Paragraph 1(e) provides for eight hours visitation 
on even-numbered calendar years for eight hours on New Year's 
Day, Easter, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving and odd-
numbered calendar years on President's Day, Memorial Day, Pioneer 
Day, Veteran's Day and Christmas Day; 
4. Paragraph 1(f) provides during odd-numbered calendar 
years when the Defendant does not have visitation for the entire 
Christmas Day, Defendant should have two hour's visitation on 
Christmas Day; 
5. Paragraph 1(g) provides for one day visitation 
during the Christmas holidays as designated by the Defendant; 
6. Paragraph 1(h) provides visitation for two hours on 
the childfs birthday. 
Plaintiff filed an objection to the proposed Order on 
April 20, 1987, and a corrected Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities on August 3, 1987. On September 11, 1987, the Court 
summarily overruled the Plaintiff Carolyn Bettinger's objec-
tions. However, nowhere does the Court set forth a basis for 
entering the scheduled visitation which is so significantly dif-
ferent than that which was originally ordered by Judge Rokich on 
September 23, 1986. 
III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE SUBMITTED 
ON REASONABLENESS 
A. Legal Standard for Entry of Attorney's Fees. 
Utah courts require that the moving party present 
evidence of reasonableness of fees to support an award of attor-
ney's fees; without the evidence and findings thereon, the court 
commits reversible error by entering a liquidated sum for 
attorney's fees. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah, 1980). 
B. The Court Awarded Defendant Cass Bettinger 
Attorney's Fees Without Taking Evidence of Reasonableness of Fees. 
Paragraph 7 of the April 21, 1987, Order awarded 
Judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of $500.00 for 
attorney's fees incurred by the Defendant Cass Bettinger in 
obtaining the Order. The evidence submitted by Defendant's coun-
sel in the March 24, 1987, hearing, was an exhibit showing a 
statement for services rendered; other than the exhibit, counsel 
proffered that the fees had been incurred for attempting to stop 
collection of the Judgment for past due child support by the 
Office of Recovery Services, obtaining appropriate visitation, 
determining child support obligations and amounts due from sale 
of the home. (March 24, 1987, Transcript, p. 10 line 3, through 
p. 12, line 12.) No other evidence on reasonableness of the fees 
charged, or an hourly rate, was presented during the hearing. 
Plaintiff Carolyn Bettinger's counsel proffered that 
the Plaintiff had only made a good faith effort to obtain child 
support and had simply followed the law in asserting her rights, 
maintaining each party should bear their own costs of court and 
attorney's fees. (March 24, 1987, Transcript, p. 19, line 22 
through p. 21, line 23.) 
Objections to entry of the award of attorney's fees 
based upon lack of evidence of reasonableness were made to the 
Court and summarily denied by the Court's Order of September 17, 
1987. No Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law were entered by 
the Court on the award of attorney's fees. 
C. The April 21, 1987, Order Awarding Attorney's Fees 
Should be Vacated. 
The Court's awarding the Defendant Cass Bettinger 
$500.00 in attorney's fees after having failed to take evidence 
on reasonableness of the fees is reversible error. Further, the 
Court's failure to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on the issue of awarding attorney's fees is reversible error. 
The Court's April 21, 1987, award of attorney's fees to Cass 
Bettinger should be vacated. 
IV, 
THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY PRINCIPLES 
OF LEGAL CONSTRUCTION TO INTERPRETATION OF 
THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS OF THE DIVORCE DECREE 
AND FAILED TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE INTERPRETATION, 
WHICH IS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
The major contention on appeal relates to the Court's 
interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original divorce 
Decree. Both Plaintiff and Defendant agree and admit that 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original divorce Decree is ambiguous 
and susceptible to differing interpretation. Defendant, in his 
Order to Show Cause, Motion and Memorandum, contends that he over-
paid the Plaintiff child support based upon his interpretation of 
the wording of the Decree and sets forth detailed calculations. 
(Record, pp. 370-273.) However, prior to Defendant's Order to 
Show Cause, the Plaintiff had obtained a Judgment in the amount 
of $2,705.00 against the Defendant for underpayment of the amount 
of child support claimed due. (Record, pp. 212-214.) Judge 
Young, in his April 21, 1987, Order, agreed with the Defendant's 
interpretation which is set forth in his Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of his Order to Show Cause under Section 
C, beginning at page 3 through page 7 (Record, pp. 334-364), and 
vacated the prior Judgment for past due child support. 
(Paragraph 5, April 21, 1987, Order.) 
The vastly different interpretation placed on paragraphs 
7 and 8 of the Decree of Divorce should have easily been 
resolvable by Judge Young by applications of construction of 
written instruments, a method which has been required by the Utah 
Supreme Court in cases where Judgments are subject to varying 
interpretation. The Courts failure to apply these principles 
is reversible error and an order of Judgment for past due child 
support. 
A. Legal Principles Regarding Construction of Ambiguous 
Judgments. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that terms in a 
judgment which are ambiguous are subject to construction 
according to the rules that apply to all written instruments. 
Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978); 
Moon Lake Water Users Association v. Hansen, 535 P.2d 1262 (Utah 
1975). 
Regarding construction of contracts, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held: "A contract made by parties should be 
construed so as to give effect to what the parties intended at 
the time it was made." DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 824 (Utah 
1978). The Court has further held that where the intent of the 
parties cannot be ascertained from the content of the instrument 
itself, and a clear ambiguity exists and cannot be reconciled, 
resort may be had to extrinsic evidence. Utah Valley Bank v. 
Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-2 (Utah 1981); Bennett v. Robinson's 
Medical Mart, Inc., 417 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 1966). 
B. Evidence Submitted on Interpretation of Divorce 
Decree. 
In support of his interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 
8 of the Decree of Divorce, the Defendant Cass Bettinger sub-
mitted an Affidavit on March 2, 1987f in support of his Order to 
Show Cause (Record, p. 244-302), a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities (Record, p. 334-342), a corrected Affidavit dated 
March 16, 1987 (Record, p. 343-360). 
On March 24, 1987, a hearing was held before Judge 
Young wherein both parties were sworn and evidence taken. As a 
result of the hearing, the court ordered that the parties submit 
additional Affidavits regarding the issues of child support as it 
relates to interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original 
Decree of Divorce (March 24, 1987, Order, p. 1; Record, p. 309.) 
On April 2, 1987, Plaintiff Carolyn Bettinger sub-
mitted an Affidavit wherein she details the basis upon which the 
parties stipulated in open court on August 14, 1980 (Carolyn 
Bettinger Affidavit, pp. 2-3; Record, p. 312-313). In those 
pages, which has heretofore been set forth in the Statement of 
Facts at pages 19-20 herein, the Plaintiff states that the 
Defendant Cass Bettinger, 
Repeatedly expressed to me at the time of his 
divorce his belief that property would again double 
in value during the 1980's and that he wanted to 
participate in that increase in equity on an 
investment basis. For that reason, he stated that 
he wanted to arrive at a settlement whereby he 
would retain the house as an investment and con-
tinue to pay the mortgage on the property...rather 
than taking one-half of the equity as it existed at 
the time of the Decree in 1980. 
She further states that she had a competing claim whereby she 
desired $300.00 per month per child for a total of $1,200.00 per 
month. Finally, to resolve the competing claims, the Plaintiff 
states in her Affidavit at paragraph C: 
We arrived at the settlement contained in paragraph 
7 of the divorce Decree separating the home and 
mortgage entirely from child support. First, 
paragraph 7...contains our agreement that the 
Defendant's equity in the home would be calculated 
as of the date of sale of the home rather than as 
of 1980, which contemplated an increasing value of 
equity. 
Further, 
Upon the first to occur of these contingencies, I 
was to receive, in addition to the child support 
ordered in paragraph 3 of the Decree, an additional 
amount of two-thirds of the house payment on the 
home as additional child support to offset my costs 
in providing another residence for the children. 
Pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Decree, Defendant 
was to pay the mortgage payments on the home, not 
as child support, but as a real estate investment 
for as long as we retained the property. 
The Defendant submitted no testimony, either in the 
March 24, 1987, hearing or by way of his March 2 and March 16, 
1987, Affidavits which relate to a basis for interpreting 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the divorce Decree. In other words, the 
only evidence submitted on interpretation of the divorce Decree 
by either party was the April 2, 1987, Affidavit from the 
Plaintiff. However, despite this clear, and only, evidence on 
interpretation, the Court relied only on paragraph C of the 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Relief Sought by Order to 
Show Cause wherein legal argument, and not facts, is submitted by 
the Defendant to support his interpretation. (Record, pp. 
336-340.) 
Based upon this interpretation, according to the 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Court held 
that the Judgment for past due child support should be vacated 
and made an interpretation of paragraph 7 which is contrary to 
the only evidence submitted on the issue. (Paragraphs 4 and 5, 
April 21, 1987, Order.) Based upon Plaintiff's evidence, the 
Court should have entered Judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of 
$12,832.55 or in the alternative, $7,877.83. 
C. The Court Failed to Enter Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on its Interpretation of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
As stated in Section I.A. herein, it is reversible 
error for a court not to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on all material issues. It is clear from the record, that 
both parties believed that interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 
of the original Decree of Divorce regarding payment of child sup-
port was the most significant issue before the Court in the 
March 24, 1987, proceeding. However, the Court has absolutely 
failed to set forth any facts or principles of law which guided 
the Court in reaching its decision. 
D. The Court's Interpretation of Paragraphs 7 and 8 
Should be Reversed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has been clear that where 
judgments are ambiguous and open to interpretation, principles of 
document construction should be applied. Judge Young, rather 
than relying on the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff for 
interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 in her April 2, 1987, 
Affidavit, relied on legal argument contained in the Defendant's 
Memorandum of Law. This method of interpretation is contrary to 
established principles of judicial interpretation of documents 
and is in error in applying law to the facts of this case. 
Further, the Court's failure to recite Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law regarding its interpretation of paragraphs 7 
and 8 is reversible error. 
This Court should vacate Judge Young's Order and 
require entry of an Order consonant with the evidence before the 
Court which shows a deficiency in child support payments by the 
Defendant, and direct the entry of judgment as stated herein and 
allow taking of evidence on the extent of the deficiency since 
February 1, 1987. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's failure to enter Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on modifying the Decree of Divorce, awarding 
attorney's fees and interpreting paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree 
of Divorce, is reversible error. The Court's failure to apply 
existing law to the facts of this case on each of the issues is 
an abuse of discretion. The Court's April 21, 1987, Order should 
be reversed and remanded in its entirety. 
/fit 
DATED this ^'-"aav of April, 1988. 
. PETERSON 
hey for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to 
Robert M. McDonald, American Plaza III, 47 West 200 South, Suite 
450, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 ,/th-*s, Cf c3ay o>^Apri 1,^ x1988;. 
26405-26415 
EXHIBIT "A" 






















































PAID DIRECTLY TO PLAINTIFF $10,065.20 
CHILD SUPPORT DUE $12,832.55 
l-Eight percent (8%) increase = $101.84 
2Eight percent (8%) increase = $56.99 
r\/Z HI C 
EXHIBIT "B" 






















































PAID DIRECTLY TO PLAINTIFF $10,065.20 
CHILD SUPPORT DUE $ 7,877.83 
Eight percent (8%) increase = $52.92 
Eight percent (8%) increase = $57.14 
EXHIBIT 1 
KObh*T * . KYKrS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 tftBt 3Ui) South, Suite 210 
*ait Lake City. Utah 64111 
Trlvphon*. 513-0222 
IN THF. TaikD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LMLt COUNTY 
STATt* OK UTAH 
) 
CAROLYN JOYCE bCTTINGC*, ) 
) 




CASS &FTTINGER, | Civil MO. D-00-931 
I 
Defendant* ) ) 
On the let day of August, 1980, this wetter caae Deform 
the above-entitJed Court* the Honorable Jamea Sawaya, District 
JuJge, presiding. Botn parties were present »nd the Plaintiff 
was represented by Attorney fcobert B. Sykea, and Defendant waa 
represented by Attorney Delwin T. Pond. Counsel for Plaintiff 
presented an oral stipulation regarding the complete settlement 
of thie Matter, which stipulation was acknowledged to be correct 
by Defendant and ordered by the Court to be Incorporated in the 
Findings of Fact and Decree. 1) a sad upon the foregoing, and goo<* 
causa otherwise appearing, 
IT If M U S T OftDlfttt, AOJ0MSD AMD MCtttDi 
1. Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce fros 
Defendant on the grounda of cental cruelty* the sane to become 
final sii aonths froa the date of entry. 
2. Plaintiff la granted care, custody and control of 
the four (4) *inor children of thie aarrlage, to wit; 
MICftFLLft, born June If, lt*7 
CHRISTOPHER CASS, born January IS, 1971 
JONATtfOti SCOTT, born March 11, 1*72 
ftlCOLS. born January 4, 1*77 
Defendant shall have reasonable visitation with each of the 
children upon reasonable notice. 
3. Defendant is orJcroJ to M y lor child eupjK>rt tne 
•mount of $200.00 p«r aontr. ^ t*r child for « total of $6uo.OO per 
month st the timr of this Dticree. One-half of the tolei sum tvr 
chilJ support in ps^sbJ- on or ootore the first (1st) dsy of 
every aonth b+ylnuiiiq Au«juet 1. XVtiO, en J the be) • nee is payable 
on or before the sixteenth (16th) dsy of every aonth thereafter. 
Payment is to be *»*<ie by way of check. 
4. Defendant Is ordered to increase the amount ot 
child eupport payments esch yesr on August 1 by en amount of * 
percent. 
5. Plaintiff is granted allnony in the amount of $1.00 
per yesr. 
*. Defendant ia oroered to ke^p in force all medical 
insurance on the children which be has through his eaploy»*nt, cr 
pay any aedical bills as they arise. Defendant is further 
ordered to psy any major or unusual aedical or dental exp^nees 
such as orthodonic braces. 
7. llaintiff i«i tvtrScZ the r.al ^ro^.rty u* t*.e 
aarrlaue in the fora of s hone located at 2740 test 4S10 aouth, 
Salt take City, Utah, subject to a lian thereon for one-half of 
the equity ttst aay be in the house at tbe tiae of liquidation 
(which contemplates an increasing equity aa the value increases). 
Tbe equity is defined %• the fair aarket value or aalea price at 
the tiae Defendant becoae* entitled to liquidate his lian aa set 
forth herein, less the aaount of aortqeges, costs of laproveaents 
aade by Plaintiff and costs of aale. This lien shall not be 
forecloeeable until the younqest child reacnea Is, or until the 
aoeie ia sold or until Plaintiff reaarriea. On the occurrence of 
any ot tbeae events, two-thirds of the house psyaenta taeo aade 
ahall Da converted to child support and that aua aball be paid to 
the Plaintiff on a aonthly basis aa additional child support. 
• • Defendant ia ordered to oootioue aekinq the 
psyaenta oo the boae. Defendant aball alao be entitled to take 
tbe aatlra lataraat portion of the houae payment aa a deduction 
for fclirfrvlf e» veil e» l!.r«* ()) Ihiwut l»i »i»r^tlont on tl«* 
children with Pleintiff to receive one exertion on the younoest 
Child at the present ties. 
t. With respect to personal property. Defendant is 
awarded hit books, the stereo (with two speakers to be left 
behind), a cock bench, two swivel chelrs, a **>ro chest, enough 
bedding* kitchen utensils, ate* to atart hie own household, tha 
fovota Cellca, subject to the balance o*ed t:»erton, a Ian1 from 
India, the bookcase wall unit, aa well as his own personal 
affects, clothing, fcnicfc-fcnecits, and auch other personal property 
aa the partita nay divide eaong thenselves. PJslntlff is awarded 
the balanoa of tha peraonal property, k'ach party will assume and 
pay any obligations on any of the property a*arde3 by the 
Decree. 
10. Defendant la ordered to assume and pay all 
housenold debts throuoh tb» rtete of the Decree as well BB those 
specified In the Complaint. 
11. The Stipulation entered into by the partiea in open 
aourt ou August 1, 19*0, is Af«coi|Oiat*«* into this D»cree by 
reference. 
12. Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance 
payable to Plaintiff and/or the children in a sufficient aaount 
to protect the expectancy interest of the children to child 
support during tbalr Minority. 
U . Plaintiff is awardad $200.00 ludgaent for 
attorney's fees against Defendant, which Defendant should pay 
within thirty (30) days. 
DATta thie day of August If SO. 
SY TM£ COUItT t 
ionoftAiLf jAars SAWATA 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
APPJtOVCD AS TO fOkJIt 
DTWIM T. POeJD 
Attorney for Defendant 
FIUC IN CtfK'S OPFiCf 
c i 
SEP ?5 4
 3s PH f85 
II J . . N . S • 
P05FRT ''.ACPI, Fso. ^20^3 irCZL^^i 
Attorney for Defendant Dt •..'» CL 
35^ East 600 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 81*111 
Telephone: (801) 36U3OIP 
IK THE TKIPD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IS A!TD FO?. SALT LAIZZ COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 





Case !?o. 08C-^?1 
A Hearinr on defendant's ''otion for Chanre of Custody and Plaintiff's 
Votion for Increased Child Curvnort VPS held before the honorable Judre Johr Pohich 
Judre of the above-entitled Court on January 2^th arc Tg-uary ?Cth, l^?c an-! var-
ious vitnesses vere called ard the children vere -privately irtervievec! by Judfe 
Pohich in his charbers and based on the testimony of the ritnesses, documentary 
evidence submitted anf received, and the rrivate interview's, the Court rahes the 
folloviny: 
IT IS K^EBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED XZD DECREED: 
1. The custody of *'ichelle Pettinyer and Jon Bettinyer is swarded 
to Cass Bettinfer, Chris Bettinyer vill rerair. '-*ith Plaintiff Carolyn Bettirrer. 
2. Cass B^ttincer sv?ll ray *?S,n^ -per ronth in addition tc his cu: 
rent Child fur^ort payr.er.ts for Chris Iettinrerfs support. 
XHIBIT 2 
3. Visitation shall he as follows: The custodial parent should >ave 
alternate weekends comencinc at c:(T ?.T\ Friday and ending 6:00 ?.•:. Sunday befin-
ninr February P, 1QPS. On weeks not preceded by weekend visitation the noncustodial 
parent is entitled to one weekend visit fror 5:00 P.::. until 10:00 IV!. on 2 ni^ht 
satisfactory to both parties. Tac r»arty is restrained hereby fror r.akirif dispara~inr 
remarks about the other party in the rresence of the children; fro:: interfering with 
the disciplinary neasures imposed by the custodial parent and fror. interfering vith 
the telephone corr.unications with the children. 
1*. Plaintiff and Defendant shall notify each other of any charges 
that have been filed against any children in their custodial care and in sufficient 
tine to allow the noncustodial parent tc attend the Hearing, if any. 
MTIZ this cjS' day of SotJ~~ , lp°S 
rY TEE COURT: 
.ML,
 a <K^a 
O^fl* A. P.OKIO::, district Court Jud~e 
A???0YID A? TO 70?;:: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
H c •'<: 
By \^f?<^2 
EXHIBIT 3 
Robert M. McDonald (#2175) 
Attorney of the Defendant 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
cnc-.
 iN.-rr.rs OFFICE 
fef. 2 2 57 ?H '81 
,• ••• t . 
{zJ&m** JS^&ycr 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 






AFFIDAVIT OF CASS BETTINGER 
Civil No. D-80-931 
Judge Judith Billings 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
CASS BETTINGER, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Defendant named in this action and have 
personal knowledge of all facts stated herein except as to those 
facts specifically stated to be based upon information and 
belief. 
2. Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter, 
I have taken custody of two of the four children born of the 
marriage. In January, 1985, Michelle (then age 18) and Jonathon 
(then age 13) began residing with me. 
3. During the last twelve months, Plaintiff has 
consistently refused to permit me to exercise my visitation 
rights with respect to the two children who reside with 
Plaintiff: Christopher, age 15 and Nicholle, age 9. When 
visitation is requested, Plaintiff claims pre-existing plans 
involving said children during the designated visitation days. 
4. Plaintiff remarried in August, 1984. I am informed, and 
on the basis of such information believe, that the marriage 
remains in existence as of the date of this Affidavit. 
5. Prior to September 22,1985, Plaintiff informed the Utah 
State Department of Social Services, Office of Recovery Services 
(hereinafter "Agency11) , that I was in default in the payment of 
child support and contracted with said Agency to collect amounts 
in default. Said Agency thereafter served a Notice of Support 
Debt and Notice of Informal Settlement Conference. Copies of said 
notices are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" and 
incorporated herein by reference. I am informed by the Utah 
Office of Recovery Service, and on the basis of such information 
believe, that the Utah Office of Recovery Services has attempted 
to garnish my wages in order to enforce the Order and Judgment of 
March 24, 1986. 
6. By reason of said Notice, I employed Robert M. McDonald, 
an attorney, to represent me before the Agency. I am informed 
that Mr. McDonald corresponded with the Agency and obtained a 
continuance of the hearing until the matter is considered by this 
Court. Despite such correspondence, the Agency has attempted to 
collect the Judgment of March 24, 1986, and thereafter served a 
garnishment upon my employer. 
7. When Plaintiff remarried in August, 1984, I claimed that 
I was entitled to a decrease in child support pursuant to the 
terms of the Decree and the change of custody. Plaintiff 
disputed my claim of reduction in support obligations. Despite 
my claim of entitlement to a reduction, I continued the monthly 
mortgage payment on the home for the sole purpose of protecting 
my equity in said home. 
8. During the period beginning with the entry of the Decree 
in this matter to July, 1981, I paid Plaintiff the sum of $800.00 
per month and paid all monthly installment payments on the home 
mortgage. The mortgage payment in August, 1984 was $275.00. 
9. Dr. Willard Stratton sent a statement for orthodontic 
services performed during 1985 and 1986 to Plaintiff for payment. 
During the time the services were rendered, Plaintiff had an 
insurance policy that covered orthodontic services. It is my 
belief that the insurance company paid Plaintiff for the services 
and Plaintiff used the insurance payment for other purposes and 
has paid nothing to Dr. Stratton for the services. Dr. Stratton 
has made demand upon me for payment. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit WC" is a schedule showing 
what I claim to be the child support obligations since the entry 
of the Decree in this matter. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit MD" is a summary of all 
payments made to plaintiff since entry of the decree up to 
October, 1986. The schedule will be updated prior to hearing. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^  day of March, ^ 
1987 . 
'_£> <? / 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g a t S a l t Lake C i t y , 
Utah 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
a-iv*f 
EXHIBIT 4 
Robert M. McDonald 
Attorney for Defendant 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
oooOooo 
CAROLYN BETTINGER aka : 
CAROLYN BOIES, 
: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiffs, RELIEF SOUGHT BY ORDER TO 
: SHOW CAUSE 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, : Civil No. D-80-931 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
Defendant submits this memorandum in support of the relief 
sought by defendant pursuant to the Order to Show Cause 
heretofore entered by the Court. All of the issues raised by 
such Order will be discussed under appropriate headings. 
A. MOTION FOR RELIEF OF JUDGMENT 
During the course of the hearing before Commissioner 
Peuler, the Commissioner orally made a recommendation that 
plaintiff be awarded judgment against defendant in the sum of 
$2,705.50 for unpaid support obligations. A minute entry stating 
the recommendation was entered on December 31, 1985. It is 
important to note that no formal recommendation was ever executed 
by Commissioner Peuler. The only evidence of the recommendation 
is the minute entry. 
O n J a n u a r V 9 - I Q A f i . H o f o n ^ a n l - nH^or*4-*aH 4- rs »-hfi A r a l 
District Court Rules of Practice, provides that an objection to 
the Commissioner's recommendation must be filed within five days 
of the recommendation. Inasmuch as no recommendation was ever 
entered (the file contains only the minute entry) defendant's 
objection was timely. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
a minute entry is ineffective to commence any time period 
including the time period allowed for appeal. State v, 
Hutchings, 672 P.2d 404 (Utah 1983); Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Company v. Clegg, 135 P.2d 919 (Utah 1943); Robison v. 
Fillmore Commercial and Savings Bank, 213 Pac. 790 (Utah 1923). 
The Court apparently did not observe the existence of 
defendant's objection and on March 24, 1986, the Court entered 
judgment in accordance with the recommendation. The fact that 
the objection was not observed by the Court at the time of the 
entry of the judgment shows on the face of the judgment itself. 
As a preface to the entry of the judgment the Court states: "... 
and counsel for neither party having failed to timely object to 
that recommendation...•" 
The Utah Department of Recovery Services, acting in 
reliance on the invalid judgment, initiated collection efforts 
and served the same upon defendant's employer. By reason of the 
apparent error showing on the face of the judgment, this Court, 
through the Honorable Judith M. Billings, stayed all collection 
efforts. See Order dated January 13, 1987. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion for Relief of the 
judgment of March 24, 1986 (filed on January 7, 1987) should be 
s tayed u n t i l hear ing and d i s p o s i t i o n of defendant ' s object ion 
which is one of the issues raised by t h i s Order to Show Cause and 
is addressed in the following s e c t i o n . 
B. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE. 
Exhibit MC" to the Corrected Affidavit of defendant 
(copy attached hereto) establishes that as of February 28, 1987, 
the total support payments for which defendant was obligated was 
$17,257.00. It should be noted this total assumes that the 
ambiguous language in paragraph 7 ot the Decree is resolved in 
favor of defendant. (See Section C, infra.) 
Copies of the cancelled checks, attached as Exhibit "D" 
to the Corrected Affidavit of defendant (copy attached hereto), 
establishes that payments for the relevant period equal 
$17,875.00. Thus, there is no basis for the judgment. Defendant 
has overpaid $618.00. 
C. PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE DECREE CONTEMPLATES A REDUCTION IN 
SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce is poorly worded. 
The paragraph provides as follows: "Plaintiff is awarded the 
real property of the marriage in the form of a home located at 
2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to a lien 
thereon for one-half of the equity that may be in the house at 
the time of liquidation (which contemplates an increasing equity 
as the value increases). The equity is defined as the fair 
market value or sales price at the time Defendant becomes 
entitled to liquidate his lien as set forth herein, less the 
amount of mortgages, costs of improvements made by Plaintiff and 
costs of sale. This lien shall not be forecloseable until the 
youngest child reaches 18, or until the home is sold or until 
Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence of any of these events, 
two-thirds of the house payments then made shall be converted to 
child support and that sum shall be paid to the Plaintiff on a 
monthly basis as additional child support." 
Plaintiff remarried in August, 1984 (Bettinger Affidavit, 
paragraph 4). In January, 1985, two of the four children began 
living with defendant (Bettinger Affidavit, paragraph 2). 
Plaintiff contends that paragraph 7 means that upon her 
remarriage or sale of the family home, defendants obligations 
for support increase because defendant roust continue making 
mortgage payments (an impossibility if the home is sold) and 
defendant must also increase child support payments in an amount 
equal to two-thirds of the mortgage payment. 
Defendant contends that paragraph 7 means that upon 
plaintiff's remarriage or upon sale of the home, his obligations 
decrease in that he no longer makes the house payment, but pays a 
greater amount of child support in an amount equal to two-thirds 
of the mortgage payment (adjusted for children reaching the age 
of majority and children who thereafter reside with defendant). 
Both interpretations can be supported if the Court 
considers only the wording of the Decree which was based upon a 
stipulation of the parties. Inasmuch as both interpretations can 
be justified by the wording, it is apparent that the wording is 
ambiguous and the Court must look behind the wording to resolve 
the dispute. 
A consideration of the underlying circumstances 
surrounding the stipulation that gave rise to the wording of the 
Decree, together with such establishes that defendant's 
interpretation is correct. In this regard, defendant invites the 
Court to consider the following: 
(a) Under plaintiff's interpretation of paragraph 7, 
when the home is sold (an event in the same category as her 
remarriage), defendant must continue to make the mortgage 
payment. Obviously, such an interpretation must be rejected 
inasmuch as after sale of the home, there would be no mortgage 
payment. 
(b) When a divorced woman remarries she thereby 
obtains an additional means of support through the earning 
capacity of her new husband. By reason thereof, when a Decree of 
Divorce provides for a change in support payments upon remarriage 
of the wife, it is logical that the change was intended to 
decrease rather than increase the support payments. 
(c) The award of the marital domicile to the wife in a 
divorce proceeding, especially when she obtains custody of minor 
children, is intended to preserve shelter for the wife and 
children. If the woman later remarries, the home then becomes 
the residence of the new husband. By reason thereof, when a 
divorce decree dictates a change upon remarriage of the wife, it 
is logical to assume that the parties intended a decrease rather 
than an increase of the former husband's obligations to make the 
house payment. Obviously defendant did not intend to provide 
shelter to plaintiff's new husband. 
(d) The wording of paragraph 7 of the Decree, although 
ambiguous, strongly suggests that the obligation to make the 
house payment terminates upon plaintiff's remarriage. The 
relevant wording of paragraph 7 is as follows: ". . . On the 
occurrence of any one of these events [i.e., sale of the family 
home or plaintiff's remarriage], two-thirds of the house payment 
then made shall be converted to child support..." [emphasis 
added. The word "converted" means "... to change from one form 
to another" and "... to exchange for an equivalent." Webster's 
New Collegiate Dictionary, 1974 Edition. On the basis of this 
definition, if two-thirds of the house payment is "converted" to 
child support, there can no longer be a house payment. 
D. SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
According to plaintiff's Affidavit dated June 28, 1985 
(copy attached hereto), the only claimed arrearage to that date 
was $1,487.50. According to the same Affidavit, the claimed 
arrearage began in February, 1985. Thus, for the purpose of this 
Memorandum, the computation of defendant's obligations and proof 
of payment will commence in February, 1985. 
Paragraph 3 orders defendant to pay child support in 
the sum of $200 per month per child for a total of $800 per 
month. Paragraph 4 of the Decree provides that the child support 
shall increase each fiscal year (August 1st is the beginning of 
the fiscal year) by an amount of 8%. This order is reflected in 
Exhibit "C" to the affidavit of Cass Bettinger in computing his 
obligations from August, 1980 to August, 1984. In September, 
1984, plaintiff remarried thereby implementing the provisions of 
paragraph 7 of the Decree. If paragraph 7 is construed in 
accordance with the contentions of defendant, this increased 
child support from $1,089 to $1,273 per month (see footnote five 
to Exhibit "C w). v 
In January, 1985, custody of two of the four children 
was transferred to defendant thereby decreasing his child support 
obligations by fifty percent from $1,273 to $636.50. Thus, the 
annual increase in August, 1985 was equal to 108% of $636.50 or a 
total of $687. (See footnote 6 to Exhibit "C" of Bettinger 
affidavit.) 
On the basis of the Decree and the subsequent events 
which triggered provisions of the Decree, defendant's total 
obligations for child support as of February 28, 1987 is 
$17,257.00. 
Photocopies of the cancelled checks and the affidavit 
of Cass Bettinger (Exhibit "D") establish an overpayment of 
$618.00. 
It is apparent that the overpayment occurred by reason 
of defendants concern to protect his equity in the home. Thus, 
although realizing he was justified in paying a lesser amount, he 
continued to make the house payment to protect against 
foreclosure by the first mortgage holder. 
E. PLAINTIFF IS INDEBTED TO DEFENDANT IN THE SUM OF AT LEAST 
$41,053.00 FOR DEFENDANTS EQUITY IN THE FAMILY HOME. 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree provides that defendant is 
awarded one-half of the equity in the family home to be computed 
on the basis of the value of the home "at the time of 
liquidation." The same paragraph awards defendant a lien to 
secure his equity. 
Paragraph seven of the Decree further provides that the 
lien is "forecloseable" when plaintiff remarries. Plaintiff 
remarried in August, 1984. 
Although the word "forecloseable" may effect the means 
by which defendant collects his equityf it clearly designates the 
date that the debt is due and owing. If a lien is 
"forecloseable" it is obviously due and owing regardless of 
whether foreclosure proceedings are initiated. 
Inasmuch as plaintiff remarried in August, 1984, she 
has owed defendant one-half of the equity in the home since that 
date. However, plaintiff has ignored her obligations to 
defendant and focused only on defendants obligations to her. 
Plaintiff falsely represented to the Office of Recovery Services 
that defendant owed her money in total disregard of her own 
obligations under the Decree. Defendant has been subjected to 
collection procedures in the expenditure of costs in attorneys' 
fees in order to resist collection efforts by the Office of 
Recovery Services. 
Plaintiff and her new husband have enjoyed defendant's 
property rights by living in the home and refusing to contribute 
to the mortgage payment* 
According to the appraisal report of Jerry F. Kelgreen, 
and the mortgage payoff figure of $17f894.00, the total equity in 
the home as of August, 1984 is $82r106.0Q. Thus, plaintiff is 
liable to defendant for $41,053.00 and such debt has been due and 
owing since plaintiff's remarriage in AUgust, 1984. The figure 
should be increased in a sum equal to one-half of the increase in 
equity since August, 1984. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTEp this] Z& day of Maoch, 1987. 
^ M\W 
Robert H. McDonald 
At torney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on the *2S~3> day of March, 1 9 8 7 , I 
caused t o be s e r v e d a t r u e and a c c u r a t e copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g 
Memorandum in Support of R e l i e f Sought by Order t o Show Cause by 
p e r s o n a l l y d e l i v e r i n g by h a n d - d e l i v e r y s a i d copy t o Mary C. 
Corporon, CORPORON & WILLIAMS, 1100 Boston B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake 
C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 . 
EXHIBIT 5 
Robert M. McDonald (#2175) 
Attorney for Defendant 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 






CORRECTED AFFIDAVIT OF 
CASS BETTINGER 
C i v i l No* D-80-931 
Judge J u d i t h B i l l i n g s 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
CASS BETTINGER, be ing f i r s t duly sworn, d e p o s e s and s a y s : 
1 . I am the Defendant named in t h i s a c t i o n and have 
personal knowledge of a l l f ac t s s ta ted herein except as to those 
f a c t s s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d to be based upon in format ion and 
b e l i e f . 
2. S ince the entry of the Decree of Divorce in th i s matter, 
I have taken custody of two of the four c h i l d r e n born of the 
marriage. In January, 1985, Michelle (then age 17) and Jonathon 
(then age 12) began res id ing with me. 
3. During the last twelve months, Plaintiff has 
consistently refused to cooperate with me as to my visitation 
rights with respect to the two children who reside with 
Plaintiff: Christopher, age 16 and Nicholle, age 9. When 
visitation is requested, Plaintiff claims pre-existing plans 
involving said children during the designated visitation days. 
4. Plaintiff remarried in August, 1984. I am informed, and 
on the basis of such information believe, that the marriage 
remains in existence as of the date of this Affidavit. 
5. Prior to September 22, 1985, Plaintiff informed the Utah 
State Department of Social Services, Office of Recovery Services 
(hereinafter "Agency"), that I was in default in the payment of 
child support and contracted with said Agency to collect amounts 
in default. Said Agency thereafter served a Notice of Support 
Debt and Notice of Informal Settlement Conference. Copies of said 
notices are attached to my original affidavit as Exhibits "A" and 
"B" and incorporated herein by reference. I am informed by the 
Utah Office of Recovery Service, and on the basis of such 
information believe, that the Utah Office of Recovery Services 
has attempted to garnish my wages in order to enforce the Order 
and Judgment of March 24, 1986. 
6* By reason of said Notice, I employed Robert M. McDonald, 
an attorney, to represent me before the Agency. I am informed 
that Mr. McDonald corresponded with the Agency and obtained a 
continuance of the hearing until the matter is considered by this 
2 
Court. Despite such correspondence, the Agency has attempted to 
collect the Judgment of March 24, 1986, and thereafter served a 
garnishment upon my employer. 
7. When Plaintiff remarried in Augustf 1984, I claimed that 
I was entitled to a decrease in child support pursuant to the 
terms of the Decree and the change of custody. Plaintiff 
disputed my claim of reduction in support obligations. Despite 
my claim of entitlement to a reduction, I continued the monthly 
mortgage payment on the home for the sole purpose of protecting 
my equity in said home. 
8. During the period beginning with the entry of the Decree 
in this matter to July, 1981, I paid Plaintiff the sum of $800.00 
per month and paid all monthly installment payments on the home 
mortgage. The mortgage payment in August, 1984 was $275.00. 
9. Dr. Willard Stratton sent a statement for orthodontic 
services performed during 1985 and 1986 to Plaintiff for payment. 
During the time the services were rendered, Plaintiff had an 
insurance policy that partially ($1,000) covered orthodontic 
services. It is my belief that the insurance company paid 
Plaintiff for the services and Plaintiff used the insurance 
payment for other purposes and has paid nothing to Dr. Stratton 
for the services. Dr. Stratton has made demand upon me for 
payment. I have paid $1,000 (one-half) of the bill as agreed. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a schedule showing 
what I claim to be the child support obligations since^Uic MliiLiy 
3 
of^-^Jv»-uaejcx^^>4n th^s--ma±>tex^ 
1 1 . At tached h e r e t o as E x h i b i t WD" i s a summary of a l l 
payments made t o p l a i n t i f f s ince , , i n ^ r y of fh? d e c r e e up tn 
Octubei, 19*&^—The~e*hi£it_ will^beL. updaied-pxixiEL £a_haa«rng-: 
DATED t h i s t*5 day of March, 1987. 
Cass 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this lb — day of March, 
1987. 
)TARY PUBLIC 
Residing a t S a l t Lake C i t y , 
Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
bar •% 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the c?5W< day of March, 1987, I 
caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
Corrected Affidavit of Cass Bettinger by personally delivering by 
hand-delivery said copy to Mary C. Corporon, CORPORON & WILLIAMS, 
1100 Boston Building, Salt Lake^eftyJ Utah 84111. 
K 
EXHIBIT "C 
TOTAL CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS ACCRUING 



































687.00(8% Increase) /• 
687.00- /^ A*\i YT^VJ^ *&** 





















TOTAL PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF 
FROM FEBRUARY 1, 1985 TO FEBRUARY 28, 1987 
A. Payments to Prudential 
Date Amount Check No, 











































































































































































































I^ Pf* •irfts 
ynt**** 
1/1/87 237.00 < 
1/15/87 237.00 # 
2/1/87 237.00 # 
Total $10,065.20 
Total Payments to Plaintiff $10,065.20 
Total Payments to Prudential $ 7,810.00 
Total $17,875.20 
•Made payable to Office of Recovery Services 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * EXHIBIT 6 






CIVIL NO. £-80-931 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON TUESDAY, THE 24TH DAY 
OF MARCH, 1987, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:20 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * 
. iLIED IN CLERKS OF":CE 
Salt Laka County Utah 
JUN 2 3 1987 
Eileen M- Ambrose. Plvfi-1*_ H Dixdfi Hinder. Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
MARY C. CORPORON 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE #1100 - BOSTON BUILDING 
#9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
ROBERT M. MC DONALD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
AMERICAN PLAZA III 
47 WEST 200 SOUTH 
SUITE #450 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
* * * 
I_ N D E X 
MR. MC DONALD'S PROFFER 
MS. CORPORON'S PROFFERS 
MRS. BOIES' RESPONSE TO VISITATION 
MR. BETTINGER'S RESPONSE TO VISITATION 
JUDGE YOUNG'S PRELIMINARY RULING 
* * * 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS 1 THROUGH 8 WERE RECEIVED 







Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 2 
LB.°_c_I.I.P_L*L5.s 
JUDGE YOUNG: THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR CONSIDERATION OF 
THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, NOW 
CAROLYN BOIES, VERSUS CASS BETTINGER. 
ARE THE PARITES READY TO PROCEED? 
MR. MC DONALD: DEFENDANT IS PREPARED, YOUR HONOR. 
DEFENDANT, MOVEANT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD EACH OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE RECORD 
STATE YOUR NAME, PLEASE. 
MR. MC DONALD: ROBERT M. MC DONALD FOR DEFENDANT. 
MS. CORPORON: MARY CORPORON FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
MR. MC DONALD: PURSUANT TO OUR DISCUSSION IN CHAMBERS, 
YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BEST IF I COULD ADDRESS THE 
COURT; PROFFER WHAT EVIDENCE WE HAVE. IF THERE APPEARS TO 
BE A DISPUTE THAT THE COURT DEEMS MATERIAL TO THE DECISION 
WE HAVE ALL OF THE WITNESSES HERE AND PERHAPS COULD PUT ON 
TESTIMONY FOR THAT LIMITED PURPOSE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT WOULD BE FINE. IS THAT ACCEPTABLE 
WITH YOU, MS. CORPORON? 
MS. CORPORON: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
MR. MC DONALD: YOUR HONOR, I THINK DESPITE THE MANY ISSUES 
RAISED BY THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE THERE ARE BASICALLY, AS WE 
DISCUSSED IN CHAMBERS, FOUR CATEGORIES, THE FIRST BEING 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 3 
VISITATION. I THINK THE COURT HAS, THROUGH ITS REVIEW OF THE 
FILE, HAS A PRETTY GOOD CONCEPT AS TO WHAT THE PROBLEM IS 
THERE. AND AS I'VE INDICATED, IF THE COURT WOULD INDICATE ITS 
FEELING ON THAT ISSUE TO THE PARTIES AND IN THE WORDS THAT 
MIGHT PROMPT AND RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM SO THESE YOUNG PEOPLE 
CAN HAVE THE BENEFIT OF BOTH PARENTS, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO 
WAIVE THE CONTEMPT OF COURT CITATION THAT WE HAD IN THERE, 
AT LEAST WITHOUT PREJUDICE, SO THAT IF THE PROBLEM PERSISTS 
THAT WE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO COME BACK AND AT THAT TIME 
ASSERT THE CONTEMPT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS THE CURRENT ORDER OF VISITATION 
REASONABLE AND LIBERAL OR IS IT SPECIFIC? 
MR. MC DONALD: I THINK IT'S REASONABLE AND LIBERAL. 
DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE REASONABLE VISITATION WITH EACH OF THE 
CHILDREN UPON REASONABLE NOTICE IS BASICALLY THE WORDING. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. 
MR. MC DONALD: WERE MR. BETTINGER TO TAKE THE STAND HE 
WOULD TESTIFY THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS AND WHENEVER 
HE ATTEMPTS TO EXERCISE THE VISITATION HE'S ADVISED THE 
CHILDREN HAVE OTHER PLANS OR IS IN SOME MANNER INCONSISTENT 
WITH PRIOR PLANS. WE FEEL THAT THE VISITATION IS OF CRITICAL 
IMPORTANCE AND SHOULD OUTWEIGH THOSE PRE-EXISTING OR CLAIMED 
PRE-EXISTING COMMITMENTS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. THE NEXT ISSUE? 
MR. MC DONALD: NEXT, YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE WE HAVE TO 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 4 
1 RESOLVE THE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS. TO SOME EXTENT IT'S 
2 ATTRIBUTABLE TO A DECREE THAT IS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS BUT AS 
3 I I'VE NOTED IN MY MEMORANDUM, YOUR HONOR, IT IS, AND WERE 
4 MR. BETTINGER CALLED TO THE STAND, HE WOULD TESTIFY AS TO 
5 THE SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LED TO THE AGREEMENT 
6 GIVING RISE TO THE DECREE. AND BASICALLY THOSE NEGOTIATIONS 
7 WOULD ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS INTENDED, UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
| REMARRIAGE THAT THE OBLIGATION WOULD NOT INCREASE BUT WOULD 
f DECREASE—THAT HE WOULD BE RELIEVED OF THE HOUSE PAYMENT 
10 BUT HIS CHILD SUPPORT WOULD INCRESE BY TWO-THIRDS. 
|| OBVIOUSLY, YOUR HONOR, MR. BETTINGER DID NOT 
12 INTEND UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S REMARRIAGE TO ASSIST IN THE 
13 SUPPORT OF HER NEW HUSBAND. THE PLAINTIFF, AS I UNDERSTAND, 
14 AND HER NEW HUSBAND OCCUPIED THAT HOME FOR MORE THAN A YEAR 
15 AFTER THEIR MARRIAGE DURING WHICH TIME THE PLAINTIFF CONTENDS 
16 THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS SUPPOSED TO MAKE THE HOUSE PAYMENT. 
17 I THINK IT'S CUSTOMARY IN THESE MATTERS THAT UPON REMARRIAGE, 
|f INASMUCH AS THE WIFE THEN OBTAINS THE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT OF 
19 HER NEW HUSBAND, THAT IT NORMALLY DECREASES NOT INCREASES. 
20 MOREOVER, I THINK IT'S CRITICAL TO NOTEIN THAT 
21 LANGUAGE THAT HER REMARRIAGE IS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE 
22 SALE OF THE HOME. SO IT SAYS, UPON REMARRIAGE OR SALE OF THE 
23 HOME THEN HIS OBLIGATION INCREASES TWO-THIRDS OF THE CHILD 
24 SUPPORT. SINCE THEY ARE BOTH IN THE SAME CATEGORY IT MUST 
25 MEAN THAT AFTER THAT TIME THE MORTGAGE PAYMENT IS NO LONGER 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 
AN OBLIGATION OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE IF THE HOME HAD BEEN 
SOLD RATHER THAN HER REMARRIAGE THERE WOULDN'T BE A HOUSE 
PAYMENT. 
ALSO, YOUR HONOR, I THINK JUST THE WORDING OF THE 
DECREE ITSELF BY USE OF THE WORD "CONVERT" CLEARLY ESTABLISHES 
THAT WHAT WAS THERE FOR A HOUSE PAYMENT WAS NOW "CONVERTED" 
INTO CHILD SUPPORT. CONVERT MEANS TO CHANGE ITS FORM, TO 
CHANGE INTO. OBVIOUSLY, IF IT CHANGES FROM A HOUSE PAYMENT| 
TO CHILD SUPPORT THERE'S NO LONGER A HOUSE PAYMENT. 
10 I AFTER THE OCCURRENCE OF HER MARRIAGE, PLAINTIFF'S) 
I) MARRIAGE, MR. BETTINGER OBVIOUSLY HAD HIS EQUITY BUILT UP IN, 
12 THAT HOUSE AND IN ORDER TO PROTECT THAT EQUITY HE CONTINUED 
13 TO MAKE THE HOUSE PAYMENT, TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT] 
14 IN THE CHILD SUPPORT. 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: CAN YOU GIVE ME SOME FIGURES AS TO THfl 
16 NUMBERS AS TO WHAT YOU ARE PROPOSING IN RELATION TO THE CHILq 
17 SUPPORT? 
18 I MR. MC DONALD: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE BEFORE THE COURT 
19 EXHIBIT 4-D WHICH WAS THE AFFIDAVIT THAT MRS. BOIES PUT IN 
20 THIS COURT DURING THE PRIOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. PARAGRAPH 
21 3 OF THAT AFFIDAVIT STATES, "DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO REMAIN 
22 CURRENT IN HIS SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND HAS PAID AS FOLLOWS.j 
23 THEN SHE INDICATES THE MONTHS OF THE ARREARAGES--FEBRUARY 
24 MARCH— 
2$ JUDGE YOUNG: I AM AWARE OF THAT. WHAT I'M REALLY ASKIN& 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 6 
IS WHAT IS YOUR PROPOSAL IN RELATION TO THE CHILD SUPPORT? 
MR. MC DONALD: THAT THE COURT ENTER AN ORDER CLARIFYING! 
THE PRIOR ORDER THAT THE TOTAL OBLIGATION FOR CHILD SUPPORT 
WOULD BE 237 PLUS THE HOUSE PAYMENT OF 310. ISN'T THAT RIGHT J 
MR. BETTINGER? 
MR. BETTINGER: I THINK SO. 
MR. MC DONALD: AT THIS POINT IN TIME—AND EXHIBIT 3-d 
GOES CLEAR BACK TO 1984 AND COMPUTES THE INCREMENTS IN HOUSE 
PAYMENTS, DEPENDING ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE, WHETHER IT iq 
THE 8 PERCENT INCREASE OR WHATEVER IN FOOTNOTES. 
EXHIBIT 2-D ALSO SHOWS PAYMENTS WITH CHECK NUMBERS 
WE'VE GOT EVERY CHECK THERE AND YOU CAN SEE THE NUMBER ON IT 
THE TOTAL OBLIGATION NOW, IF THE DECREE IS CONSTRUED IN" 
ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT WE CONTEND WOULD BE THAT FIGURE—237 PLUS; 
$310.00. 
JUDGE YOUNG: $310.00? 
MR. MC DONALD: HHM-HHM. ASSUME THOSE OBLIGATIONS ATi 
THAT LEVEL, YOUR HONOR, OUR COMPUTATIONS AS STATED IN MY| 
MEMORANDUM SHOW AN OVERPAYMENT AT THIS STAGE OF $618.00. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO IF I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION IT IS Oil 
THE CHILD SUPPORT THAT IT CONTINUE AT THE RATE OF $237.00 M 
MONTH, THAT THE HOUSE PAYMENT CONTINUE AT THE RATE OF $310.0(1 
PER MONTH AND THAT THE COURT FIND THAT THE SUPPORT HAS BEEN 
PAID IN EXCESS IN THE AMOUNT OF THE 600— 
MR. MC DONALD: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 7 
JUDGE YOUNG: —PLUS. OKAY, I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION. 
MR. MC DONALD: THE NEXT ISSUE THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED, 
CATEGORIZING ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, 
IS WHAT TO DO WITH THE HOME. THAT HOME HAS BEEN LISTED, ASl 
I UNDERSTAND NOW FOR WHAT, THREE YEARS NOW. I TRIED TO GET| 
THE INITIAL LISTING AGREEMENT. AND IT HASN'T SOLD. 
THE THING THAT GAVE RISE TO CONCERN ON MY PART WAS| 
I HAD MR. KELLGREEN, THE INDIVIDUAL WHO'S APPRAISED THE HOME, 
ARRANGE TO GO OUT AND LOOK AT IT AND PROVIDE AN APPRAISAL. 
WHEN HE WENT OUT THERE—HE FIRST CONTACTED THE REALTOR. ANDl 
WERE HE CALLED TO TESTIFY THIS WOULD BE THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS| 
TESTIMONY, THE REALTOR SAID SHE DIDN'T HAVE ACCESS TO THE HOME. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS THE HOME LISTED NOW? 
MR. MC DONALD: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THERE IS NO KEY BOX ON THE HOME? 
MR. MC DONALD: NO KEY BOX. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS THERE ANY REASON-
MRS. BOIES: YES, THERE IS. WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL INCIDENTSJ 
OF NEIGHBORHOOD KIDS BREAKING INTO THE HOUSE. AND HAVING A 
KEY BOX ON THE HOUSE IS AN OPEN INVITATION THAT THE HOUSE IS 
EMPTY. AND WE'VE HAD TO REPAIR SOME DAMAGE ON IT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: HAVE YOU EVER HAD THE KEY BOX ABUSED? 
MRS. BOIES: NO, BUT WE DON'T NEED A KEY BOX NOW BECAUSE! 
THERE IS A HOUSE SITTER IN THE HOUSE ANYWAY AND THERE'S OPEN 
ACCESS TO IT ALL THE TIME. 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 8 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. OKAY. 
MR. MC DONALD: IN ANY EVENT, YOUR HONOR, WE'D ASK THEJ 
COURT IN THE LIGHT OF THE HISTORY RELATING TO THE SALE TO 
ENTER AN ORDER PROVIDING THAT THE DEFENDANT, MR. BETTINGER, 
MAY NOW, AT LEAST TRY HIS HAND IN MOVING THIS HOUSE, THAT HE| 
BE ABLE TO SELECT THE REALTOR. WE CAN REVIEW THE PRESENT 
LISTING CONTRACT TO SEE IF WE ARE STILL BOUND BY IT. AT LEAST| 
HE COULD CONTACT THE REALTOR WHO IS BOUND BY THAT LISTING 
AGREEMENT AND PROVIDE FOR THE VIEWING OF THE HOUSE AND HAVEl 
THAT REALTOR REPORT TO HIM. IN THAT MANNER WE BELIEVE THAT 
WITH HIS EFFORTS WE MIGHT BE MORE SUCCESSFUL IN MOVING THAT 
HOUSE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. 
MR. MC DONALD: I THINK THAT ORDER WOULD FACILITATE THE| 
SALE. 
ANOTHER THING, I AM NOT CERTAIN SINCE THE PLAINTIFF] 
HAS NOT PROVIDED MR. BETTINGER WITH ANY INFORMATION ON IT, 
AS TO WHEN THE LISTING EXPIRES, WHAT THE ARRANGEMENT IS WITH| 
THE PEOPLE THAT ARE THERE, WHETHER THEY ARE RECEIVING RENT. 
AND PERHAPS COUNSEL CAN ADDRESS THAT. IF, IN FACT, THEY ARE 
RECEIVING RENT I THINK THAT THAT RENT IS PART OF THE INCOME 
OF THE DEFENDANT AS WELL AS THE PLAINTIFF. IF THEY ARE NOT 
RECEIVING RENT WE SHOULD, AT LEAST, GIVE MR. BETTINGER THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THAT INDIVIDJAL AND, IF 
NECESSARY, RENT IT OUT. IF THERE'S A VANDALISM PROBLEM AT 
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LEAST GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO CONTROL THAT HOME AND AS FAR AS] 
RENTAL, HOUSE SITTERS AND LISTING AGREEMENTS. 
FINALLY, YOUR HONOR, ANOTHER ISSUE I THINK SHOULD] 
BE CONSIDERED, AND IS RAISED BY THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, IS 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. THIS HAS BEEN A VERY EXPENSIVE 
PROPOSITION FOR MR. BETTINGER. AND I HAVE PROVIDED THE COURT 
WITH EXHIBIT 7-D WHICH IS A LIST OF MY STATEMENT FOR SERVICES! 
TO THIS DATE. AS THE COURT WILL SEE THERE MUCH OF THE PROBLEM! 
HERE STEMS FROM THE PLAINTIFF CONTACTING THE OFFICE OF 
RECOVERY SERVICES, NOT INFORMING THEM THAT HE WAS INDEBTED 
TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR FORTY-ONE THOUSAND BUT MERELY NOTING, 
AND INCORRECTLY SO, THAT HE WAS INDEBTED TO HER FOR A COUPLE, 
OF THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR FAILURE TO MAKE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
AS SHOWN BY OUR EXHIBITS THAT WAS NOT THE CASE. 
SO AT THAT POINT THE OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, 
AND I HAVE THE NOTICES THAT THEY SENT TO MR. BETTINGER MARKED! 
AS EXHIBIT 5, TELLING HIM THEY ARE GOING TO START DEDUCTING 
DIRECTLY FROM HIS INCOME THEREBY DISRUPTING HIS RELATIONSHIP 
WITH HIS EMPLOYER. HE, AT THAT POINT, CONTACTED ME. I SPENT 
CONSIDERABLE TIME IN DEALING WITH THE OFFICE OF RECOVERY 
SERVICES WHO DO A VERY GOOD JOB AT WHAT THEY DO. THEY ARE 
VERY IMPATIENT AND IT'S PRETTY HARD TO BUY THEM OFF REGARD-
LESS OF WHAT YOU TELL THEM. AND SO THAT TOOK A LOT OF WORK. 
SECONDLY, AFTER THAT HAPPENED, SINCE I DIDN'T MOVE 
FAST ENOUGH FOR THEM, THEY GARNISHED MR. BETTINGER'S WAGES. 
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AGAIN, I HAD TO PREPARE AN AFFIDAVIT, COME DOWN AT THAT POINT 
IN TIME, JUDGE BILLINGS WAS ON THE BENCH. SHE REVIEWED THE 
ORDER AND STAYED ALL OF THAT COLLECTION PROCEDURE UNTIL THIsI 
HEARING. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I SAW THE ORDER. 
MR. MC DONALD: AND, YOUR HONOR, I JUST DON'T THINK THAT] 
WAS A GOOD FAITH. AND I REALIZE IN MOST INSTANCES IN THESE 
SETTINGS THE COURTS ARE RELUCTANT TO ASSESS ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AGAINST A WIFE OR FORMER WIFE, BUT BY THE SAME TOKEN, I JUSTl 
THINK THAT THERE HAS TO BE SOMETHING DONE IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE! 
TO EQUALIZE THIS BURDEN THAT'S BEEN THRUST ABOUT MR. BETTINGER. 
SHE DIDN'T COME DOWN HERE TO THE COURT FIRST TO ATTEMPT TO 
RESOLVE THIS AMBIGUITY, SHE MERELY ASSUMES WHAT IS IN HER 
FAVOR, REPORTS IT BY AFFIDAVIT AND THEN COMMENCES A PROCEEDING! 
THAT HE HAS TO DEAL WITH IN ORDER TO SAVE HIS EMPLOYMENT 
AND IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST WHAT I THINK IS AN 
ABSOLUTE ABUSE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS. AND I JUST DON'T THINK] 
IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TO PAY ALL OF THE| 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
I THINK WE'VE GOT THE VISITATION, WHICH I THINK) 
WAS WRONGFULLY DENIED. THAT'S ONE REASON WE'RE HERE. 
WE HAVE THE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION, THAT I THINKJ 
CLEARLY NO ONE INTENDED WHEN SHE REMARRIED, WOULD INCREASE. 
WE GOT THE HOME WHERE SHE HASN'T TRIED TO SELL IT. 
SHE OWES HIM MONEY AND SHE REPORTS TO OTHER PEOPLE HE OWES HERj 
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MONEY. I THINK IT WOULD BE UNJUST IF HE WOULD HAVE TO BEAR 
THAT BURDEN AND EXPENSE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME SEE IF I UNDERSTAND FROM YOUR 
EXHIBIT ON ATTORNEY'S FEES WHAT YOU ARE REQUESTING. IS THE 
FRONT PAGE ON THE STATEMENT FOR SERVICES ON 7-D $1814.00?| 
IS THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT YOU ARE REQUESTING OR IS THE— 
MR. MC DONALD: NO, YOUR HONOR, THEY ARE CUMULATIVE. 
THOSE ARE THE ACTUAL BILLS I SENT HIM. AS YOU'LL SEE AFTER 
EACH ITEMIZATION OF TIME THERE IS A RATE OR AN AMOUNT FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. IN SOME OF THE STATEMENTS THE BALANCE IS| 
CARRIED FORWARD. OTHER TIMES HE PAID THE STATEMENT SO THE 
BALANCE WASN'T CARRIED SO THEY ARE ACTUALLY CUMULATIVE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I SEE. 
MR. MC DONALD: YOU CAN SEE IT'S BEEN A REAL EXPENSIVE] 
PROPOSITION. 
ALSO, YOUR HONOR, I HAVE MARKED HERE AS AN EXHIBIT] 
THE APPRAISAL OF MR. JERRY KELLGREEN--OR THOUGHT I HAD. INJ 
ANY EVENT, IF CALLED TO TESTIFY MR. KELLGREEN WOULD STATE 
THAT THE VALUE OF THE HOME IS $100,000.00. 
JUDGE YOUNG: CAN YOU TELL US, MISS CORPORON, WHAT THE] 
LISTING PRICE HAS BEEN ON THE HOME? 
MRS. BOIES: NINETY-THREE FIVE. AND THAT'S THE THIRD] 
PRICE IT HAD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S FINE. 
MR. MC DONALD: ALSO, YOUR HONOR, TO THE EXTENT IT WILL] 
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1 ASSIST THE COURT, PRUDENTIAL, WHO HOLDS THE FIRST MORTGAGE, 
2 WE ASKED THEM FOR A PAYOFF AMOUNT. THAT IS SHOWN ON EXHIBIT 
3 6-D. AND THE PRINCIPAL BALANCE AS OF THE DATE OF THIS 
4 DOCUMENT, WHICH IS I THINK MARCH, SOME TIME IN MARCH, IS THE 
5 PAYOFF AMOUNT—IT'S AS OF FEBRUARY 9TH, 1987—IS $17,893.00. 
6 THAT'S WHERE I COME UP WITH THE $41,000.00 DEBT. 
7 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
t MR. MC DONALD: THE APPRAISAL IS 8-D. 
9 JUDGE YOUNG: DOES THAT COVER THE ISSUES, MR. MC DONALD? 
10 MR. MC DONALD: YES, YOUR HONOR, TO THE EXTENT THE COURT 
|| WISHES TO HEAR ANY TESTIMONY ON THAT, THE WITNESSES ARE HERE. 
12 JUDGE YOUNG: I THINK WE WILL WAIT ON THAT. I WOULD LIKE 
13 YOU TO EACH REVIEW THE EXHIBITS THAT YOU ANTICIPATE HAVING 
14 INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE AND DETERMINE WHETHER THERE'S ANY 
15 OBJECTION TO THOSE. 
16 I MS. CORPORON: I HAVEN'T SEEN ANY OF THOSE EXHIBITS, YOURJ 
17 HONOR. 
18 JUDGE YOUNG: WHY DON'T YOU PROVIDE MISS CORPORON WITH 
19 THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE EXHIBITS AND IF YOU WISH TO 
20 PROCEED, MISS CORPORON, AS TO YOUR CLIENT'S POSITION ON THE 
21 ISSUES THAT WE'VE DISCUSSED, VISITATION, CHILD SUPPORT, THE 
22 HOME AND COSTS AND FEES, AND IF THERE'S ANYTHING ELSE THAT 
21 NEEDS TO BE RESOLVED AT THIS POINT, YOU MAY ADDRESS YOURSELF] 
24 TO THAT AS WELL. 
2$ MR. MC DONALD: IF I MAY INTERRUPT FOR ONE MINUTE. MY 
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CLIENT REMINDS ME I NEGLECTED TO NOTE ONE PROBLEM. THERE 
WAS AN ORTHODONTIST BILL. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I'VE READ THE ORTHODONTIC MATTER. 
MR. MC DONALD: IF THE COURT IS ADVISED ON THAT I WON'T 
TAKE FURTHER TIME. WE'D ALSO ASK FOR THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WILL YOU ADDRESS YOURSELF, MISS CORPORON, 
TO THE ORTHODONTIC BILL? IT IS REPRESENTED THERE WAS 
APPROXIMATELY $1,000.00 RECEIVED BY YOUR CLIENT THAT DID NOT 
GO TO THE ORTHODONTIC PAYMENT. 
MS. CORPORON: THIS IS A NEW ISSUE TO ME. THAT WAS NOT 
RAISED IN THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IT IS DISCUSSED IN THE PLEADINGS. 
MS. CORPORON: IN WHICH PLEADINGS, YOUR HONOR? 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, IT IS DISCUSSED IN THOSE I HAVE READ. 
THAT'S ALL I CAN TELL YOU. IT MAY BE IN THE MEMORANDUM THAT 
WAS FILED LAST NIGHT WHICH YOU INDICATED YOU HAVE NOT HAD 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW. 
MS. CORPORON: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. SO I SIMPLY 
HAVE-
JUDGE YOUNG: FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE REFERENCE TO 
THE ORTHODONTIC BILL IS THAT THE DEFENDANT CLAIMS THAT THERE] 
WAS DENTAL COVERAGE IN THE AMOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY $1,000.00 
WHICH HE CLAIMS THAT YOUR CLIENT RECEIVED THE THOUSAND DOLLARS, 
DID NOT APPLY IT TO THE DOCTOR'S BILL AND THE DOCTOR HAS 
CONTINUED TO BILL HIM FOR THAT AMOUNT. 
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MRS. BOIES: THIS IS ALL NEWS TO ME. IF I RECEIVED 
INSURANCE PAYMENTS I DEPOSITED THOSE INSURANCE PAYMENTS. 
I DON'T RECALL ANY TO THE DENTIST THAT I DIDN'T PAY. I'M 
NOT SAYING THAT'S NOT POSSIBLE BUT THIS IS ALL NEWS TO ME. 
I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS AT ALL. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. MISS CORPORON, IF YOU WILL GO 
AHEAD AND ADDRESS THE ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED, 
PLEASE. 
MS. CORPORON: YES, YOUR HONOR. FIRST OF ALL WITH 
REGARD TO THE HOUSE ISSUE, THE HOME. SHE WAS MARRIED IN 
AUGUST OF 1984, REMARRIED. AND THAT'S THE TRIGGERING, THE 
FIRST TRIGGERING EVENT TO OCCUR UNDER THE DECREE. THE HOME 
HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY LISTED FOR SALE SINCE AUGUST OF 1984. 
SHE AND HER NEW HUSBAND OCCUPIED THE HOME FOR EXACTLY ONE 
YEAR AFTER AUGUST OF 1984 AND THEN THEY CEASED TO OCCUPY IT. 
A PROBLEM WE'VE HAD WITH SELLING THE HOME IS THE 
ROOF COLLAPSED IN THE SUMMER OF 1986 WHICH HAD TO BE REPAIRED 
AND WAS REPAIRED TOTALLY AT HER EXPENSE. 
THE HOUSE HAS HAD A HOUSE SITTER LIVING IN IT FOR 
QUITE SOME TIME NOW. SHE STATES TO ME SHE'S HAVING SOMEONE 
LIVING THERE RENT FREE TO TAKE CARE OF THE HOME FOR SEVERAL 
REASONS. SHE NEEDED SOMEONE WHO COULD AGREE TO MOVE OUT 
IMMEDIATELY IF SHE HAD A BUYER, SOMEONE WHO WOULD AGREE THAT 
SHE COULD TRUST TO KEEP THE HOUSE IN A SHOWABLE CONDITION, 
AND WOULD AGREE TO SHOW THE HOME, AND SOMEONE WHO WOULD HAVE 
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A KEY AVAILABLE THERE AND ALSO--
JUDGE YOUNG: WHO IS THE HOUSE SITTER? 
MRS. BOIES: HIS NAME IS ELI DURAN. HE IS A GRADUATE 
STUDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DURAN? 
MRS. BOIES: D-U-R-A-N. 
MS. CORPORON: ALSO, IN ORDER TO INSURE THE HOME IT HAD 
TO BE OCCUPIED AND, THEREFORE, SHE'S HAD THE HOUSE SITTER. 
IT WAS HER OPINION, AND SHE WOULD TESTIFY, THAT HAVING A 
REGULAR RENTER IN THE HOME WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY 
ARE TRYING TO SELL IT BECAUSE SOMEONE WHO'S NOT THERE UNDER 
A VERY SPECIAL UNDERSTANDING WHO THINKS THAT THEY ARE PAYING 
THE RENTAL VALUE OF THE HOME AND HAVE THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY 
UNDISTURBED AND IS NOT LIKELY TO COOPERATE WITH SHOWING THE 
HOME BECAUSE IT'S NOT IN THEIR BEST INTEREST TO HAVE THE 
HOUSE SOLD AND BE FORCED TO MOVE. AND THEY ARE NOT AS LIKELY 
TO KEEP THE HOUSE IN A SHOWABLE CONDITION AND TO COOPERATE 
WITH SHOWING. SO SHE WANTS TO HAVE SOMEBODY WHO KNEW JUST 
WHAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE ON SHOWING THE HOME. 
SHE WOULD OBJECT TO THE IDEA OF LEAVING THE ENTIRE 
LISTING ARRANGEMENT IN THE HANDS OF THE DEFENDANT. SHE 
BELIEVES THAT HE IS OUT OF TOWN 75 PERCENT OF THE TIME WITH 
HIS BUSINESS, THAT HE'S NOT GOING TO BE AVAILABLE TO SHOW THE 
HOME. SHE LIVES IN SALT LAKE CITY AND IS AVAILABLE VIRTUALLY 
100 PERCENT OF THE TIME IF THERE IS AN OFFER THAT COMES IN OR 
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OR SOMEBODY HAS QUESTIONS OR NEEDS AN OWNER THERE TO SHOW IT. 
SHE WOULD PROFFER THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS NEVER 
INQUIRED OF HER PERSONALLY WHAT THE STATUS IS ON THE HOME, 
WHO'S OCCUPYING IT, WHAT THE LISTING ARRANGEMENT IS AND SO 
FORTH. NO ONE CONTACTED HER, APPARENTLY, ABOUT THIS 
APPRAISOR WAS GOING TO COME OUT WHICH MAY HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR| 
THE PROBLEMS WITH HAVING THE APPRAISOR GET INTO THE HOME. 
SHE WOULD PROFFER SHE OFFERED TO CASH HIM OUT OVER1 
A YEAR AGO FOR $20,000.00 AND THAT SHE HAS ALSO SENT A LETTER! 
TO HIM AND INQUIRED--A LETTER DATED MARCH 6, 1987—INQUIRING! 
WHETHER HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ACCEPTING AN OFFER WITH THE 
LEASE OPTION AND OUTLINING THE TERMS OF THE LEASE OPTION. 
SINCE MARCH 6TH SHE'S HAD NO RESPONSE TO THAT LEASE OPTION 
POSSIBILITY EITHER. 
WE WOULD PROFFER AND WE BELIEVE THAT IF CROSS-
EXAMINED THEIR WITNESS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE WITH THE BOARD OF 
REALTORS FIGURES WHICH APPEARED IN THE BUSINESS SECTION OF 
THE PAPER LAST SUNDAY TO THE EFFECT THAT IN 1986 ONLY 23.7 
PERCENT OF THE HOMES LISTED IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY AREA 
ACTUALLY SOLD DURING THAT YEAR. AND WE WOULD PROFFER HER 
TESTIMONY THAT HER—THE PROBLEM THAT SHE'S HAVING SELLING 
THE HOME IS A RESULT OF THE MARKET. SHE HAS IT LISTED BELOW 
WHAT THEY CONSIDERED THE APPRAISED VALUE TO BE AND YET THEY 
ARE NOT GETTING ANY OFFERS OTHER THAN THIS POSSIBLE LEASE 
OPTION THAT SHE'S RECENTLY INQUIRED ABOUT. 
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WE WOULD ASK THAT THEY SIMPLY LEAVE THE SITUATION 
AS IS, PERHAPS CONSIDER TO CONTINUING TO DROP THE PRICE UNTIL 
THE THING SELLS AND LEAVE THE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE HOME 
AS THEY ARE. BUT OTHER THAN THAT THERE'S NOT MUCH THAT WE CAN 
DO TO FIND A BUYER OTHER THAN WHAT SHE'S BEEN DOING ALREADY. 
WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF VISITATION, AND MRS. 
BOIES HAS INDICATED TO ME SHE FEELS QUITE STRONGLY ABOUT THIS 
AND WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE COURT PERSONALLY. I DON'T KNOW) 
WHAT THE COURT'S VIEW IS ON THAT BUT I WOULD PROFFER IN HER| 
10 I BEHALF THAT THE DEFENDANT, SHE PERCEIVES THE DEFENDANT HAS 
H INVOLVED THE CHILDREN CONTINUALLY IN THE DISPUTES BETWEEN 
12 THE PARTIES. AND I THINK IF YOU REVIEWED THE FILE YOU WILL 
13 NOTE THAT HIS PREVIOUS COUNSEL OF RECORD WAS OBTAINING 
14 AFFIDAVITS FROM THE CHILDREN AND GETTING THEM INVOLVED IN THIS 
15 LEGAL PROCEEDING. SHE INDICATES TO ME THE CHILDREN WERE 
16 ACTUALLY SUBPOENAED TO COURT ON ONE OCCASION IN THIS CASE AND 
17 SHE THINKS THAT A GREAT DEAL OF THE ANIMOSITY THAT EXISTS NOW 
18 AS FAR AS VISITATION IS CONCERNED IS OF HIS OWN MAKING. 
19 SHE WOULD PROFFER SHE HAS ENCOURAGED THE VISITS; 
20 HE HAS TOLD THE CHILDREN THEMSELVES, IN HER PRESENCE, IF THEY 
21 DON'T WANT TO COME WITH HIM THEY DON'T HAVE TO. AND WE ARE 
22 DEALING HERE WITH A 45 YEAR OLD AND A 16 YEAR OLD. AND THEY 
2| HAVE OFTEN TAKEN HIM UP ON THAT OPPORTUNITY NOT TO COME AND 
24 VISIT WITH HIM. 
25 SHE WOULD ALSO PROFFER THAT THE CHILDREN HAVE TOLD 
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HER REPEATEDLY THAT THEY ARE VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THEIR 
STEPMOTHER, THE DEFENDANT'S WIFE, THAT THEY FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE 
IN HER PRESENCE AND SHE BELIEVES THAT HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH 
THEIR RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN VISITATION. 
AS I INDICATED IN CHAMBERS, I THINK ESPECIALLY WITH 
THE 16 YEAR OLD BOY WHO IS BIGGER THAN HIS MOTHER AND 
PHYSICALLY, FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES AN ADULT, IT IS IM-
POSSIBLE FOR HER TO FORCE HIM INTO AN AUTOMOBILE IF HE DOESN'T 
WANT TO GET INTO THE AUTOMOBILE TO GO. AND SHE WOULD PROFFER 
THAT SHE HAS TOLD HIM TO GO, REQUESTED HIM TO GO, AND THAT 
HE HAS, ON OCCASION, REFUSED TO DO THAT. SHE HAS NEVER HERSELF] 
TOLD THE DEFENDANT HE CAN NOT HAVE VISITATION WITH THE 
CHILDREN OR SHE WON'T LET THE CHILDREN GO, 
WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF CHILD SUPPORT IT 
WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS MEMORANDUM THAT WAS SUBMITTED, 
I WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO. THAT WAS 
APPARENTLY DELIVERED TO MY OFFICE LAST NIGHT AFTER 4:00 O'CLOCK. 
I LEFT MY OFFICE AT 4:00 AND I HAVE NOT SEEN THE MEMORANDUM 
REFERRED TO. IF I MAY SIMPLY DEFER MY ARGUMENTS ON THE CHILD) 
20 I SUPPORT TO MY MEMORANDUM I WOULD LIKE TO DO THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
21 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
22 MS. CORPORON: FINALLY, WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF 
23 THE ATTORNEY'S FEES. WE WODLD PROFFER THAT SHE TOLD THE OFFICE 
24 OF RECOVERY SERVICES EVERYTHING ABOUT THE FACTS OF THIS CASE] 
25 INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A LIEN ON THE HOME, 
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THAT THE HOME HADN'T SOLD AND HE HADN'T BEEN PAID HIS LIEN 
INTEREST. SHE BELIEVES THAT THERE IS A SUPPORT ARREARAGE 
EXISTING AT THIS TIME WHICH I WILL OUTLINE IN THE MEMORANDUM 
AND THAT SHE'S MADE THAT CLAIM IN GOOD FAITH. I THINK THAT 
EVERYONE CAN AGREE THAT THIS IS CERTAINLY AN UNUSUALLY WORDED 
DECREE. IT IS NOT AN EASY FORMULA TO CALCULATE UNDER THE 
PRECISE WORDING OF THE DECREE AND THAT SHE'S BEEN ACTING IN 
GOOD fAITH IN MAKING THAT CLAIM. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT DOES SHE CLAIM THE ARREARAGE AMOUNT 
IS? 
MS. CORPORON: THROUGH MARCH HER CONTENTION IS THAT THE 
ARREARAGE IS $10,086.00. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU HAVE AN AFFIDAVIT UPON WHICH YOU 
RELY TO BASE THAT? 
MS. CORPORON: NOT AN AFFIDAVIT, YOUR HONOR. I HAVE AN 
ACCOUNTING WHICH SHE HAS SUPPLIED TO ME TODAY INDICATING HOW 
SHE ARRIVES AT THAT. I CAN ATTACH THAT AS PART OF MY MEMOR-
ANDUM WITH OUR ARGUMENT AS TO HOW WE ARRIVE AT THAT FIGURE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: HAVE YOU SHOWN THAT TO MR. MC DONALD? 
MS. CORPORON: NO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND I ASSUME YOUR POSITION THEN IN RELATION 
TO COSTS AND FEES IS THAT EACH BEAR THEIR OWN. 
MS. CORPORON: YES, YOUR HONOR—WELL, WE HAVE SUBMITTED 
A REQUEST IN FRONT OF THE COMMISSIONER WHEN THIS WAS HEARD 
BACK IN 1985 THAT HE PAY HER ATTORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE OF THE 
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SUPPORT ARREARAGE CLAIM. AND SINCE WE'VE BEEN BROUGHT BACK 
TO COURT ON THIS MATTER WE PERSIST IN THAT CLAIM THAT HE PAY 
OUR ATTORNEY'S FEES. HE EARNS APPROXIMATELY $80,000.00 PER 
YEAR, SHE WOULD PROFFER HER INCOME IS $11,000.00 PER YEAR. 
CLEARLY, THERE'S A DISPARITY IN INCOME. AND I THINK THAT THE 
HISTORY, THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS CASE IS SOMEWHAT 
RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
SHE COMMENCED THIS ACTION FOR SUPPORT ARREARAGE 
IN MAY OF—BY CONTACTING HER PREVIOUS ATTORNEY, CON KOSTOPULOS, 
IN MAY OF 1985. AND THIS IS STILL DISPUTING OVER THE ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE THAT WAS HEARD ULTIMATELY IN SEPTEMBER OF 1985, 
A RULING OF THE COMMISSIONER IN DECEMBER OF 1985 AND NOW WE 
ARE STILL HERE IN COURT. SHE'S HAD ENUMERABLE HEARINGS AND, 
FRANKLY, IT'S OUR PERCEPTION THAT SOME OF THE DIFFICULTY AND 
THE DISPUTE IN COMING BACK TO COURT SO MANY TIMES HAS BEEN 
PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL-
JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT DO YOU PROFFER AS THE REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PAYMENT TO HER? 
MS. CORPORON: YOUR HONOR, I'D SUBMIT THAT MY ATTORNEY'S 
FEES IN THIS MATTER WOULD BE $750.00. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MS. CORPORON: I'VE REPRESENTED HER IN THIS MATTER SINCE 
JANUARY OF 1986. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MS. CORPORON: YOUR HONOR, MRS. BOIES HAS AGAIN INDICATED 
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TO ME SHE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE COURT REGARDING 
VISITATION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. WOULD YOU RAISE YOU RIGHT HAND 
AND BE PUT UNDER OATH. 
CAROLYN J. BOIES, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF, HAVING 
BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND 
NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT'S YOUR TESTIMONY IN RELATION TO 
VISITATION? 
MRS. BOIES: THIS BUSINESS WITH THE VISITATION HAS BEEN 
A PROBLEM FOR A LONG, LONG TIME. EVER SINCE THIS DIVORCE 
CAME ABOUT. AND WE WENT THROUGH A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS 
WHERE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE ASKING TIME. HE WOULD NOT CALL 
ME AND SAY CAN I HAVE THE CHILDREN COME AND VISIT ME THIS 
WEEKEND. HE WOULD SHOW UP AT MY DOOR OR CALL FIVE MINUTES 
BEFORE AND SAY I WANT TO TAKE THE KIDS OUT FOR PIZZA. WE HAD 
A PROBLEM WITH THIS FOR QUITE A WHILE. 
THE LITTLEST CHILD, REPEATEDLY I WOULD DRIVE HER 
OVER TO HIS HOUSE TO HAVE HER CALL ME WITHIN AN HOUR CRYING 
TO COME PICK HER UP. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE PROBLEM IS. IT 
APPARENTLY HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED BETWEEN HIM AND THE YOUNGEST 
CHILD. 
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TIME AFTER TIME HE HAS CALLED UP THE CHILDREN, 
MADE AGREEMENTS FOR THEM TO GO TO VISITATION WITH HIM. I HAVE 
HELD THEM TO THAT VISITATION WHEN OTHER THINGS HAVE COME UP 
THAT THEY WANTED TO DO AND NOT GO TO VISITATION WITH THEIR 
DAD. I HAVE PERSONALLY DRIVEN THE CHILDREN OVER TO HIS HOUSE 
ONLY TO BE MET AT HIS DOOR BY HIM SAYING NO, THEY DON'T HAVE 
TO COME WITH ME IF THEY DON'T WANT TO. WHAT THEY WANT IS WHAT 
THEY CAN DO. THEY DON'T HAVE TO COME WITH ME IF THEY DON'T 
WANT TO. 
IT GOT TO THE POINT WHERE I WAS IN THE HOT SEAT 
IF I ENFORCED THE VISITATION. AND IT GOT TO THE POINT WHERE 
I'M NOT GOING TO BE INVOLVED IN THIS ANY MORE. IF THE CHILDREN 
WANT TO GO, IF THEY DON'T WANT TO GO, I'M NOT GOING TO 
INTERFERE. THEY ARE ENCOURAGED TO GO. MY CHILDREN HAVE NEVER 
EVER BEEN TOLD BY ME OR ANYONE ELSE YOU CAN'T GO VISIT YOUR 
DAD. 
AND MY 16 YEAR OLD SON IS HIGHLY MOBILE. HE'S GOT 
A GIRLFRIEND IN SANDY. HE GOES AND VISITS HER ALL THE TIME 
IN SPITE OF THE FACT HE DOESN'T HAVE A CAR. HE'S EQUALLY 
CAPABLE OF GOING TO VISIT HIS DAD ANY TIME HE WANTS TO. HE 
DOES. BUT THEY GO WHEN THEY WANT TO GO AND IF THEY DON'T WANT 
TO GO THEN THEY DON'T GO. 
AND I'M BLAMED FOR THIS. HE SAYS THIS IS NY FAULT, 
I'M DENYING HIS VISITATION WITH THE CHILDREN WHEN THE FACT OF 
THE MATTER IS THE CHILDREN DO GO FOR VISITATION BUT THEY DON'T 
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GO ALL THE TIME AND THEY DON'T GO IF THEY DON'T WANT TO GO. 
AND THE PRESSURE IS PUT ON ME TO HAVE THEM READY TO GO AT 
6:00 O'CLOCK ON FRIDAY NIGHT, WHICH IS VERY DIFFICULT TO DO 
WITH A 16 YEAR OLD BOY WHO'S GOT A DATE WITH HIS GIRLFRIEND 
AT 6:00 O'CLOCK FRIDAY NIGHT. 
WHAT'S HAPPENED A NUMBER OF TIMES ALSO THE CHILDREN 
WILL JUST LEAVE THE HOUSE; THEY WILL GO OUT THE BACK DOOR AT 
5:00 O'CLOCK, COME HOME AT 10:00 O'CLOCK. AND MANY TIMES I'VE 
DRIVEN THEM TO THEIR FATHER'S HOUSE AT 10:00 O'CLOCK UNDER 
PROTEST. 
NOW, THAT'S MY POSITION IN THIS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS THAT THE END OF YOUR TESTIMONY? 
MRS. BOIES: FOR THE VISITATION. 
MR. MC DONALD: CAN I HAVE MR. BETTINGER BRIEFLY RESPOND, 
YOUR HONOR? 
CASS BETTINGER, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, HAVING 
BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND 
NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU HAVE ANY RESPONSE TO THAT? 
MR. BETTINGER: YES, I DO. THE VISITATION RELATIVE TO 
MY 16 YEAR OLD SON IS NOT A REAL SERIOUS PROBLEM BECAUSE I 
FEEL THAT HE'S OF AN AGE WHERE HE CAN MAKE UP HIS OWN MIND 
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AND HE'S NOT EASILY INTIMIDATED BY ANYONE ELSE. AND SO 
OCCASIONALLY HE WILL CALL ME AND WE WILL GET TOGETHER OR I 
WILL TRY TO GET AHOLD OF HIM WHICH IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE HE'S 
GONE A LOT. AND LIKE LAST NIGHT HE CALLED ME AND I PICKED 
HIM UP AND WE SPENT SOME TIME TOGETHER. 
THE REAL PROBLEM HERE IS WITH MY TEN YEAR OLD 
DAUGHTER. I SAW HER FOR CHRISTMAS IN 1985, DID NOT SEE HER 
AGAIN UNTIL HER BIRTHDAY IN JANUARY OF 1987. SO I HAD NO 
VISITATION WITH HER FOR OVER A YEAR. DURING THAT TIME ON 
NUMEROUS OCCASIONS I WOULD CALL THE HOUSE TO REQUEST TO SPEAK 
WITH HER RELATIVE TO ARRANGING SOMETHING. AND WHENEVER MRS. 
BOIES WOULD ANSWER THE PHONE NICOLE WOULD EITHER BE ASLEEP, 
IN THE BATH, PLAYING WITH FRIENDS OR OTHERWISE UNAVAILABLE. 
WHENEVER MR. BOISE WOULD ANSWER THE PHONE AND NICOLE WAS HOME 
GENERALLY, I'D SAY 95 PERCENT OF THE TIME, SHE WOULD COME TO 
THE PHONE, WE'D HAVE A NICE CONVERSATION. 
MY CONTENTION IS SIMPLY THAT NICOLE IS VERY CLOSE 
TO HER MOTHER, SHE DOESN'T WANT TO UPSET HER MOTHER, THAT SHE 
KNOWS VERY DEFINITELY THAT HER MOTHER DISAPPROVES OF HER 
VISITING ME AND THAT SHE RESPONDS ACCORDINGLY. MY CONTENTION 
IS THAT SHE FEELS INTIMIDATED AND SHE WOULD LIKE TO SPEND SOME 
TIME WITH ME. AND SO VERY SIMPLY ALL I'M SAYING IS THAT I 
BELIEVE THAT IT'S UNFAIR FOR ME NOT TO SEE MY TEN YEAR OLD 
DAUGHTER FOR OVER A YEAR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS SHE TEN YEARS OLD NOW? 
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MR. BETTINGER: YES. SO I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOME 
SPECIFIC VISITATION ESTABLISHED SO THAT I CAN AT LEAST SEE 
HER ONCE IN A WHILE BECAUSE I DON'T THINK IT'S RIGHT FOR THAT 
TO TAKE PLACE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO YOU ARE ASKING FOR A SPECIFIC ORDER OF 
VISITATION? 
MR. BETTINGER: YES, I AM. AND I WOULD BE MORE THAN 
HAPPY, IF THE COURT WANTED TO APPOINT SOMEONE TO SIT DOWN WITH 
MY DAUGHTER AND TALK TO HER ABOUT THIS, TO DELVE INTO HER 
FEELINGS TO ESTABLISH WHAT EXACTLY THE PROBLEMS ARE. I'D BE 
MORE THAN HAPPY TO SEE THAT HAPPEN BUT I WOULD JUST LIKE TO 
SEE THIS ISSUE RESOLVED SO I CAN SPEND SOME TIME WITH MY 
DAUGHTER. IT'S AS SIMPLE AS THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I THINK I UNDERSTAND THE POSITIONS OF THE 
PARTIES IN RESPECT TO VISITATION. LET ME SAY TO BOTH OF YOU 
THAT THE COURT WILL DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO SEE THAT 
PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED. I BELIEVE THAT YOU, MRS. BOISE, 
HAVE AS MUCH RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT NICOLE MAINTAINS A 
CONTINUING, HEALTHY, APPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIP WITH HER 
FATHER AS HE DOES TO CLAIM HIS RIGHT OF VISITATION. 
MRS. BOIES: I AGREE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I BELIEVE THAT IS YOUR DUTY AND YOUR 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT YOU MUST DO EVERYTHING YOU CAN TO 
ENCOURAGE A NORMAL, HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP. SO I WANT YOU TO 
KNOW THAT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. 
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I WILL ENTER A SPECIFIC ORDER OF VISITATION. IT'S 
COMMON THAT THIS COURT ENTERS ORDERS OF VISITATION EVERY OTHER 
WEEKEND AND ALTERNATING RED LETTER HOLIDAYS AND HALF OF 
CHRISTMAS AND SIX WEEKS IN THE SUMMER. I'M WILLING TO PUT 
ALL OF THAT IN AN ORDER IF YOUR COUNSEL CANNOT OTHERWISE AGREE. 
THAT WILL BE A SPECIFIC ORDER OF THIS COURT. 
LET ME TELL YOU BOTH THAT MY PREFERENCE IS THAT 
VISITATION BE REASONABLE AND LIBERAL BECAUSE THAT LANGUAGE 
THEN WITH MATURE PEOPLE GIVES YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THIS 
WEEKEND AND NOT NEXT, OR TWO IN A ROW AND NOT THE NEXT TWO, 
OR PLAN YOUR FAMILY VACATIONS SO THAT NICOLE CAN GO WITH HER 
FATHER ON HIS VISITATION WHEN IT'S CONVENIENT TO HIM AND WORK 
IT OUT BETWEEN ALL OF YOU BECAUSE MATURE PEOPLE OUGHT TO BE 
ABLE TO WORK THAT OUT, BUT WHAT HAPPENS IS PRETTY SOON YOU 
GET A SPECIFIC ORDER AND THE WIFE SAYS WELL, IT'S HIS WEEKEND 
HE'S NOT COMING BY, I GUESS HE DOESN'T WANT TO SEE YOU. ALL 
IT DOES IS CREATE A DIFFICULT ATTITUDE IN A CHILD THAT HAS TO 
GROW UP ALREADY IN AN ENVIRONMENT THAT THE CHILD DIDN'T PREFER 
BECAUSE THE CHILD DIDN'T ASK YOU TO GET DIVORCED AND THE CHILD 
DIDN'T ASK YOU TO DIVIDE YOUR INTERESTS IN THAT CHILD. SO 
WHAT YOU DO IS YOU CREATE FOR THE CHILD THE PROBLEMS. SO A 
SPECIFIC ORDER CAN CREATE THEN THE DIFFICULTY BECAUSE THEN ONE 
OR THE OTHER OF YOU IS TRYING TO ENFORCE OR INTERFERE WITH THE 
ORDER AND THE CHILD COMES UP CONFUSED. SO I WILL TELL YOU 
BOTH I PREFER TO HAVE THE VISITATION STATE REASONABLE AND 
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LIBERAL. IF THAT'S INADEQUATE AND YOU CAN'T AGREE TO IT I 
WILL ENTER A SPECIFIC ORDER AND I'VE GIVEN YOU AN INDICATION 
OF WHAT THAT ORDER WOULD SAY, BUT I DON'T PREFER THAT. YOU 
CAN DECIDE WITH YOUR COUNSEL AS TO WHICH YOU PREFER, IF EITHER 
ONE OF YOU WANT THE SPECIFIC ORDER THAT WILL BE THE ORDER OF 
THE COURT. ALL RIGHT? NOW, I THINK THAT PRETTY WELL TELLS 
YOU HOW I FEEL ABOUT VISITATION. I THINK THAT THAT DAUGHTER 
HAS A RIGHT AND THAT THE MOTHER HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE 
THAT THE DAUGHTER SPENDS TIME WITH HER FATHER. 
I'M JUST ANNOYED WITH THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH 
THIS COURT HAS TO DEAL WITH THAT ISSUE. THE INTERFERENCE IS 
SUBTLE; THE INTERFERENCE IS INCONVENIENCE; THE INTERFERENCE 
IS IN THE BATHTUB; THE INTERFERENCE IS OUT PLAYING, SHE'S 
ASLEEP, ALL OF THOSE KINDS OF THINGS. WELL, WHAT REALLY OUGHT 
TO HAPPEN IS IF, IN FACT, SHE IS IN THE BATHTUB SHE OUGHT TO 
CALL AS SOON AS SHE'S OUT. THAT MAKES IT EASY BUT IT DOESN'T 
HAPPEN BECAUSE SHE FEELS THAT IT'S AN INTERFERENCE WITH YOU 
AND SHE DOES-
MRS. BOIES: THAT'S NOT WHAT SHE FEELS. 
20 I JUDGE YOUNG: BUT SHE DOES BELIEVE THAT SHE SHOULDN'T 
21 CALL AND SHE IS AFRAID TO CALL. I DON'T WANT TO HEAR WHAT 
22 YOUR REASON IS BECAUSE I'VE HEARD IT ALREADY. I WANT TO SORT 
23 THE PROBELEM OUT IN A MATURE WAY. I WANT YOU TO RESOLVE IT 
24 WITH HER. OKAY? THAT'S WHAT I WANT. 
25 I WANT THIS THING RESOLVED. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT 
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YOU ARE BOTH MATURE PEOPLE AND OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO RESOLVE 
IT. WHAT YOU OUGHT TO DO IS YOU OUGHT TO HAVE HER CALL UP 
AND LET HER TELL HER DAD SHE DOESN'T WANT TO TALK BUT SHE 
BETTER NOT HEAR THAT FROM YOU. 
MRS. BOIES: SHE NEVER HAS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I HOPE SHE NEVER WILL. 
NOW, IN RELATION TO CHILD SUPPORT THAT WON'T BE 
RESOLVED UNTIL YOU'VE PROVIDED YOUR AFFIDAVIT AS TO WHAT THE 
ARREARAGES ARE. LIKEWISE, WILL ALSO BE THE ATTORNEY'S FEES 
10 I PROBLEM. 
11 IN RELATION TO THE HOME IT DOESN'T SEEM TO ME THAT 
12 THE HOME IS BEING RESPONSIBLY MANAGED. IT DOESN'T SEEM TO ME 
13 THAT SOMEBODY WITHOUT AGREEMENT BETWEEN BOTH OF YOU WHEN THE 
14 HOME—YOU EACH OWN THAT HOME RIGHT NOW, YOU EACH HAVE AN 
15 EQUITABLE INTEREST. HE CONTINUES TO PAY THE MORTGAGE. HE 
16 OUGHT TO BE CONSULTED AS TO WHETHER SOMEBODY'S GOING TO LIVE 
17 THERE FREE. HE SHOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY GETTING HIS REAL 
18 ESTATE AGENT INTO THE HOME. JF HE WANTS A KEY BOX ON THE HOME 
19 THERE OUGHT TO BE A KEY BOX ON THE HOME. THAT OUGHT TO BE 
20 EASY. THAT CAN BE HANDLED WITH A REALTOR. IT'S A COMMON 
21 PRACTICE. THE HOME OUGHT TO BE OPENLY ACCESSIBLE TO ANYBODY 
22 THAT WANTS TO LOOK AT IT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING 
23 PURCHASING IT. 
24 I I THINK SINCE THE DEFENDANT DOES PAY THE MORTGAGE 
25 THAT THE DEFENDANT OUGHT TO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HOME 
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SO I WILL ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANT BE THE ONE TO WHOM THE 
MANAGEMENT OF THE HOME IN THE FUTURE IS DIRECTED. IF THERE 
IS A RENTER THAT YOU CAN RENT THE HOME TO THEN WORK THAT OUT 
AND SHARE THE RENTAL, OFFSET THE MORTGAGE AGAINST THE RENTAL 
SO THAT IT'S RESPONSIBILY DEALT WITH. YOU CAN WORK OUT WITH 
ELI DURAN WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE AS TO WHETHER HE'S 
TO LIVE THERE RENT FREE. IF YOU FEEL THAT'S IN THE BEST 
INTEREST OF PRESERVING THE ASSET THEN LET HIM DO IT. I THINK 
THAT RESOLVES THE ISSUE OF THE HOME. I THINK THE HOME SHOULD 
CONTINUE TO BE LISTED FOR SALE. 
OBVIOUSLY, YOU ARE NEVER GOING TO BE ABLE TO SELL 
THE HOME WITHOUT BOTH OF YOU AGREEING ON A PURCHASE PRICE OR 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE. IF THAT'S NECESSARY TO BE RESOLVED BY 
THE COURT AT THE TIME IT'S PRESENTED TO THE PARTIES BECAUSE 
YOU CAN'T AGREE TO IT, IF ONE IS WILLING TO ACCEPT AND THE 
OTHER IS NOT, THE COURT CAN RESOLVE IT AT THAT TIME, BUT I 
THINK BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT MRS. BOIES LIVED IN THE HOME 
FOR A YEAR DURING WHICH TIME MR. BETTINGER PAID THE MORTGAGE 
AND BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE HOME IS NOW VACANT, IT'S 
CRITICAL THAT BOTH OF YOU HAVE A COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE 
j VALUE OF THAT ASSET AND THAT YOU DO IT IN A RESPONSIBLE WAY. 
SO I THINK IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO TRANSFER THAT 
RESPONSIBILITY TO MR. BETTINGER. 
THAT LEAVES ONLY THE TWO ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED ON 
COSTS AND FEES. LET ME SAY—AND THE CHILD SUPPORT. THOSE 
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WILL BE RESOLVED FOLLOWING THE PRESENTATION TO THE COURT OF 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL OR ADDITIONAL MEMORANDA. 
AS TO THE ORTHODONTIC BILL I WANT THAT TO BE 
EXAMINED BY BOTH OF YOU. AFTER REVIEWING--YOU HAVEN'T HAD AN 
OPPORTUNITY, MISS CORPORON, TO RESPOND TO THAT, BUT AFTER 
REVIEWING THE MEMORANDUM THAT HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
IF, IN FACT, THE ORTHODONTIC BILL WAS PAID TO MRS. BOIES AND 
SHE FAILED TO PAY THAT ON THE ORTHODONTIC BILL SHE WILL BE 
ASSESSED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAKING THAT PAYMENT. 
IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. MC DONALD: ONE OTHER THING, YOUR HONOR. COULD I 
HAVE AN ORDER ALSO THAT THE—UNTIL THE COURT RESOLVES THE CHILD 
SUPPORT PROBLEM THAT THE OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES IS FURTHER 
STAYED FROM ANY ENFORCEMENT? 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OBJECTION TO THAT ORDER? 
MS. CORPORON: I WOULD ANTICIPATE—MAY WE HAVE TEN DAYS 
TO SUBMIT OUT MEMORANDUM? 
JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY HAVE TEN DAYS TO SUBMIT YOUR 
MEMORANDUM, BUT PENDING THAT AND THE RULING OF THE COURT YOU 
HAVE NO OBJECTION TO RECOVERY SERVICES BEING STAYED, DO YOU? 
MS. CORPORON: I DON'T THINK THAT TEN DAYS IS GOING TO 
MAKE THAT MUCH DIFFERENCE, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT CERTAINLY WOULD BE THE ORDER OF THE 
COURT SO I THINK IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR YOU TO OBJECT 
BUT I WANTED TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THE OPPORTUNITY. 
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ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. MC DONALD: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
LET ME ASK, BEFORE WE GO FORMALLY INTO RECESS, WE 
DID NOT ENTER THE EXHIBITS. DO YOU WISH THEM TO BE— 
MR. MC DONALD: I WOULD OFFER THEM INTO EVIDENCE, YOUR 
HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OBJECTION TO THOSE EXHIBITS? 
MS. CORPORON: I STILL HAVEN'T HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK 
AT THEM, YOUR HONOR. I ASSUME THEY ARE SUMMARY EXHIBITS OF 
HIS TESTIMONY. I DON'T HAVE ANY OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THEY WILL BE RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBITS 1 THROUGH 8 WERE 
OFFERED AND RECEIVED INTO 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
* * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I 
AM A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
THAT AS SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED 
THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME 
AND PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN 
SHORTHAND THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD 
THEREIN; AND THAT THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID 
SHORTHAND NOTES INTO TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING 
TRANSCRIPTION IS A FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION 
OF THE SAME. 
EILEBNJM. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1988. 
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